From the retaliation over the deployment of THAAD to the dispatch of troops to the Hormuz, any Korean could not help but feel a sense of humiliation over the U.S.-China bipolar standoff, especially China's display of its own military prowess. Fortunately, Korea is not the only country to feel this way. So I imagined a second Bandung Conference. It was simply an assignment that had to be resolved if there was a problem.
I've been debating with AI and organizing the discussion for months, and it's fortunate that AI lacks a super-rational ability, so it cannot act in politics independently. The inability to engage in political activity also means that one cannot make judgments of good and evil. Artificial intelligence has the limitation of inevitably possessing an 'instrumental self.' So when AI causes a problem, the problem lies with the 'human' who uses it as a 'tool.'
Living with parents who suffered from the trauma of the Korean War, I perceived the very situation of the divided North and South Korea as humiliating. On the other hand, it is also recognized as a tool for predicting our future. I believe that a future in which North and South Korea cooperate or unify is inevitable.
After the G2: A Third Convergence,
Korea’s Chokepoints, and North Korea’s Opening
Lee Hyeong-chun · Independent Columnist
September 26, 2026
Labeling convention: (Fact) marks what has been confirmed, (Inference) marks the author’s reasoned judgment, and (Normative) marks the direction the author hopes for. Many web sources were checked only at the headline and link level (see the verification note at the end).
The US–China duopoly is likely to persist for now, but who benefits from it is not settled. If Washington is squandering the backlash effect that China’s displays of power created, the gain may flow toward a third convergence. To avoid being a mere participant in that flow, South Korea must turn its technological chokepoints into bargaining power, and on the peninsula the test case is North Korea’s opening. This column builds that argument while keeping prediction and preference apart.
1. The Duopoly Remains, but the Poles Do Not Harden into One
Given the gaps in economic, military, and technological capacity, the United States and China are likely to remain the two centers for a considerable time (Inference) [1][2][3][4]. But bipolarity is not completed by the power of two states alone; it also depends on where everyone else stands. Unlike the Cold War, there are no firm blocs today. India, Türkiye, the Gulf states, and ASEAN trade with both sides and spread their risk (Inference). The distribution of power is close to bipolar, while political behavior is close to multipolar. There is analysis suggesting that even Beijing advertises multipolarity rather than a G2 (Fact, headline-level check) [5]. A US–China summit took place in Washington on September 24 [6][7], but whether its outcome is cooperation or managed rivalry has not been verified against the full text, so I withhold judgment.
2. Who Collects the Backlash?
When China displayed power in the South China Sea, in the THAAD retaliation, and in border clashes, its neighbors closed ranks: the Quad, AUKUS, Japan’s defense expansion, and the renewed US–Philippines alignment (Fact). That closing of ranks was not built by Washington; it was supplied by Beijing’s own conduct.
The question is who receives the benefit. States alarmed by China are looking for security, and the alternative can be the United States or an autonomous space between the two powers. If Washington pressures even its allies with tariffs and cost-sharing demands, countries wary of China become wary of both (Inference). Reports describe pushback from BRICS members over US tariffs and energy trade [9], and commentary argues that the Trump–Xi summit exposes a US disadvantage in the Global South and that tariffs are redrawing the global power map [8][10] (Fact, headline-level check).
Whether this is a Trump blunder will be settled by results; if tariffs extracted real concessions, it was not a blunder. The author’s view that his line is temporary (a normative and predictive judgment) faces strong objections: he was elected twice, and the hard line on China is shared by both parties. Even if temporary, allies have already learned that America can choose such a leader, and that lesson persists as a hedging structure (Inference).
3. Convergence Works as a Possibility, Not as a Body
Whether a second Bandung will actually convene cannot be known. It took six years from the 1955 Bandung Conference to the 1961 Non-Aligned summit [11][12]. Today’s Global South is far more heterogeneous, as the India–China rivalry shows, and if anti-American solidarity looks like pro-Chinese solidarity, participation shrinks (Inference).
Even so, the author argues this: even if a third convergence is never completed, the prospect of one can act as pressure that makes both Washington and Beijing restrain themselves, since each wants to avoid losing the middle powers. On this reading, whether the convergence is completed hardly matters (Inference). The weaknesses are plain. Peaceful posture can be tactical, and the convergence can collapse from within through G2 cooperation between the two powers or through separate inducements to key states.
4. Korea: Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities
The Hormuz episode left South Korea with a sense of humiliation. But before turning a feeling into policy, the facts must be checked. In early September there were reports that Washington was waiting for a deployment [19]; on September 19, reports said Seoul conveyed its willingness to contribute at US–Korea diplomatic talks and that the United States made no deployment request (Fact, headline-level check) [17][18].
The path the author proposes for Korea is this (Normative). First, use hard-to-replace technological chokepoints, namely semiconductors, shipbuilding, and defense industry, as the source of bargaining power. But these chokepoints depend on foreign lithography equipment, design software, and materials, so they are not wholly ours, and they can become targets of great-power demands for investment and production (Inference). Second, the essence of Hormuz is the vulnerability of energy routes resting on a single strait, so energy and supply-chain diversification must proceed alongside technological strength. Korea’s diversification moves are already under discussion (Fact, headline-level check) [13][14][15][16]. Diversification, however, is not autonomy; autonomy exists only when a state has prepared alternatives and can actually refuse.
5. North Korea: The Author’s Normative Choice
This section describes the direction the author hopes for, not a forecast. Each item is presented with its objections.
5.1 US–North Korea negotiations
The United States should negotiate with North Korea so that Pyongyang need not depend on China alone (Normative). Reports that Trump has reached out and that Kim Jong Un responded positively coexist with the assessment that Kim’s snubbing is working in his favor (Fact, headline-level check) [20][21][22]. There are objections. North Korea is known to have secured another patron in Russia (Inference), and the nuclear issue and the risk of Seoul being sidelined remain. The author holds that opening matters more than sidelining, but concedes that who frames the opening determines what follows.
5.2 Nuclear weapons and conventional forces
Reduce conventional forces first and convert that strength into economic development (Normative). Because nuclear weapons are close to North Korea’s identity, a freeze with verification is unrealistic, and abolition is left as a long-term goal. The cost of this choice is not hidden: it means accepting greater security anxiety in Japan and South Korea and a weakened nonproliferation regime. Large-scale demobilization touches both the army, the regime’s core base, and unemployment, so a design that preserves the military’s interests is needed.
5.3 The red line: legalized markets, with no rollback
In exchange for a long-term guarantee of the regime’s survival, the author’s minimum demand is the legalization of the jangmadang markets and a ban on rolling it back (Normative), attached to observable indicators such as property protection, no arbitrary confiscation, and guaranteed payment. The rationale is research suggesting that markets create independent income and channels for information that weaken state control [23]. There are limits: markets and repression can coexist, as in China. North Korea is known to have suppressed markets in its 2009 currency reform (Inference), which is why the ban on rollback is the heart of the red line.
5.4 The target model and human rights
What the author hopes for is a capitalist authoritarian state like Singapore (Normative). But Singapore’s core was not authoritarianism; it was rule of law, property rights, predictable contract enforcement, and low corruption [25]. The question is whether hereditary power would bind itself to law, and a realistic path may be closer to Vietnam or China (Inference).
I do not accept that the level of human rights simply equals the level of the economy. South Korea’s rights gains were not an automatic product of growth but came through citizens’ struggle. The political prison camps are a matter the UN Commission of Inquiry judged gravely [24]. The author’s proposal takes weakened control through markets as the priority path. This is a normative choice and open to criticism. The Helsinki Final Act, which accepted the status quo while attaching human-rights and exchange provisions to induce long-term change, is a useful precedent [26].
5.5 Opening and the dissolution of division
The author hopes that opening, even if it looks like entrenching the division, will in the end dissolve it (Normative). But China and Taiwan show that deep economic exchange can coexist with lasting political division; trade does not guarantee integration. The two Koreas share a language, so Southern influence can seep in naturally, but for that very reason Pyongyang’s leadership may feel opening is more dangerous (Inference). The paths the author offers for dissolution are information inflow, generational change, and a narrowing economic gap.
6. Conditions That Would Break This Argument
Washington adjusts its tariff and cost-sharing policy or reaches separate deals with allies, and the grievances subside.
China resumes coercive behavior and middle powers return to the American side.
India sharply improves or worsens ties with Washington or Beijing, removing a core member of the convergence.
The convergence stays at the level of statements and never becomes institutional, such as payment systems or consultative bodies.
North Korea opens but again suppresses the markets or cuts only its channels to the South.
7. Conclusion
Whether a third convergence will be completed is unknown. But the possibility alone forces restraint on both Washington and Beijing. For South Korea to be an agent that turns that possibility into reality, it needs real capacity in technological chokepoints and energy resilience, and on the peninsula it needs to set a principle around opening North Korea’s markets. Half of this column is prediction and half is preference. Readers should judge by where the line between them falls.
References
[1] Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.
[2] East Asia Forum (2025-12-17). US–China G2 undermines multipolarity. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/17/us-china-g2-undermines-multipolarity/
[3] Observer Research Foundation. Return of the G2: Trump, China, and the Mirage of a Bipolar World. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/return-of-the-g2-trump-china-and-the-mirage-of-a-bipolar-world
[4] Modern Diplomacy (2026-09-18). The Myth of a Multipolar World: Why the Global Order Is Becoming More Bipolar, Not Less. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/09/18/multipolar-world-new-bipolar-order-us-china/
[5] China-Global South Project (2026-07-21). Why Beijing Wants Multipolarity Instead of a G2 With the U.S. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2026/07/21/china-rejects-g2-multipolar-world-global-governance/
[6] Al Jazeera (2026-09-24). Trump-Xi summit: Four key takeaways from the Washington, DC, meeting. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/24/trump-xi-summit-four-key-takeaways-from-the-washington-dc-meeting
[7] NBC News. Trump-Xi summit: Leaders meet at White House amid tensions over Taiwan, trade and AI. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/trump-xi-summit-meet-white-house-tensions-taiwan-trade-ai-rcna598073
[8] Al Jazeera (2026-09-25). The Trump-Xi summit exposes a US disadvantage in the Global South. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/9/25/the-trump-xi-summit-exposes-a-us-disadvantage-in-the-global-south
[9] WION News. BRICS Summit 2026: Trump must be watching amid pushbacks from member states on US tariffs, conflicts and energy trade. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/brics-summit-2026-trump-must-be-watching-amid-pushbacks-from-member-states-on-us-tariffs-conflicts-and-energy-trade-1788857773139
[10] Geopolitical Monitor. Global South Can Gain as Trump Tariffs Redraw Global Power Map. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/global-south-can-gain-as-trump-tariffs-redraw-global-power-map/
[11] Asian-African Conference (1955). Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung, 24 April 1955.
[12] Wikipedia. 1st Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Summit_of_the_Non-Aligned_Movement
[13] East Asia Forum (2026-06-18). South Korea's middle power diplomacy at an inflection point. https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/06/18/south-koreas-middle-power-diplomacy-at-an-inflection-point/
[14] Asia Times (2026-04). Seoul pivots southward again, restructuring for strategic autonomy. https://asiatimes.com/2026/04/seoul-pivots-southward-again-restructuring-for-strategic-autonomy/
[15] Observer Research Foundation. South Korea's Trade Reset: Diversifying Beyond the US and China. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-trade-reset-diversifying-beyond-the-us-and-china
[16] Korea Economic Institute of America. How South Korea Is Trying to Increase Its Supply-Chain Resilience. https://keia.org/analysis/how-south-korea-is-trying-to-increase-its-supply-chain-resilience/
[17] 서울신문 (2026-09-19). 한미 외교회담에서 호르무즈 기여 의지 전달…“파병 요구 없어”. https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/international/2026/09/19/20260919500005
[18] 뉴스1 (2026-09-19). 韓, 미국에 호르무즈 기여 의지 전달…“美, 파병 요구 없어”(종합). https://www.news1.kr/world/usa-canada/6295959
[19] 네이트 뉴스 (2026-09-06). 美 “파병 기다린다” 이란 “침략 간주”…한국 ‘호르무즈 딜레마’. https://m.news.nate.com/view/20260906n06301
[20] Al Jazeera (2026-08-18). ‘Very positive’: Trump says Kim Jong Un has responded to his overtures. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/18/trump-says-n-koreas-kim-has-responded-to-his-request-for-a-conversation
[21] Washington Examiner. Kim Jong Un is ghosting Donald Trump — and it’s working. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/4706768/trump-kim-jong-un-summit-2026-nuclear-talks/
[22] Chatham House (2026-01). North Korea in 2026: Will the US and South Korean push for talks succeed? https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/north-korea-2026-will-us-and-south-korean-push-talks-succeed
[23] Haggard, S. & Noland, M. (2011). Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Peterson Institute for International Economics.
[24] UN Human Rights Council (2014). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A/HRC/25/63.
[25] Lee, K. Y. (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000. HarperCollins.
[26] Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975). Final Act (Helsinki Final Act).
Source Verification Note
Web sources [2]–[10] and [12]–[22] were checked at the level of search-result headlines and links at the time of writing; the full texts were not read. They are used only to show that a debate or a report exists, and any detail or figure should be verified against the original before publication. Points that rest on background knowledge, such as North Korea’s ties with Russia and the 2009 currency reform, are marked in the text as (Inference) or “is known to have.”
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