A few days ago, I toured various places in Chungcheongbuk-do, using my father's relocation issue at the National Cemetery as an excuse. I thought only Gangwon Province had been devastated, but it seemed like Chungcheongbuk-do was worse off. I've been there every 20 years, and it seemed to be getting more and more worn out each time. The somber realities of the Korean War, the regional representation of lawmakers, the lack of professional representation among them, and the connection between politicians’ lust for power and the war all overlapped in a confusing manner.
The AI and I began this debate with the topic of whether there would be no war if there were no desire for power. Then the issue of dividing regions between politicians and the public arose, and it even escalated to questions about the electoral system. I had known for 40 years that Switzerland was forming its parliament under a functional representative system. Only now have I had my misconceptions corrected by artificial intelligence.
As We All Search for Higher Places We need to consider whether this has even caused severe imbalance across the country. Because Korea's land is small, I believe the concentration in the metropolitan area will pose a major obstacle not only to land use efficiency but also to resource allocation and the driving force of development.
This discussion lasted quite a long time. Therefore, the organization was allowed to flow in the direction of the discussion. Even if I tell the AI to tidy me up, it has absolutely no ability to sort through the thoughts that are running through my head.
The Capital-Centered Structure
and Regional Decline
From the Desire for Power to Electoral Systems and Balanced National Development — A Discussion Summary
Lee Hyeong-chun · Independent Columnist
November 11, 2026 · English edition, summarized from a discussion with Claude
Evidence tags — [Verified] confirmed by a cited source · [Inference] logical inference or interpretation · [Theory] relies on academic literature (bibliographic details to be rechecked) · [Experience] the author’s firsthand experience · [Unverified] a claim not confirmed
Summary
The discussion began with the question of whether a desire for power can be eased by work or by physical and artistic activity. It then moved through responsibility for war, the over-representation of lawyers in politics and camp-based politics, the East–West regionalism of Korea, regional decline and living-sphere hubs, and finally the interest structure around the capital region and its correction through electoral reform. Three claims emerged. First, the decline of regional hub cities can be read as the product of a structure built by two interests together: the property interests of individual legislators and the interests of the capital-region majority of voters. Second, the correction should logically start with the electoral system but run in parallel with administrative measures. Third, the goal is not to keep every locality’s population but to keep the jobs, medical care and education functions of hub cities and the access that ties surrounding areas to them. Some of the key causal links remain unverified.
Keywords desire for power, habit of dividing, electoral system, multi-member districts, proportional representation, regionalism, regional decline, living-sphere hubs, balanced national development
1. Starting Point: Can Work and Physical Movement Ease the Desire for Power?
The author says that while studying law he wanted a high position, and that discovering this was not his nature caused him distress. In technical and field work he saw fewer power-seeking people, and physical movement helped him most in managing his desire for status. [Experience]
This observation has a selection effect. Work may not cool the desire for power; people with a weaker desire for power may simply be the ones who stay in field work. [Inference] Field work has hierarchy too, but it is tied to skill and may take a less overtly competitive form, while the arts, where evaluation is subjective, may involve fiercer status competition. [Inference] The catharsis hypothesis, that discharging aggression through activity reduces it, has weak empirical support (Bushman, 2002). [Theory]
In sum, what work and physical movement ease is the need to prove one’s own competence; the wish to stand above others is often left untouched. The deciding variable is not the kind of activity but whether its feedback depends on others’ recognition or rank. [Inference] In the author’s case the direction of causation (does the environment change the desire, or does nature choose the environment?) remains open, and the ability to feel the desire as distress and examine it may be an important variable. [Inference]
2. War, Power and Responsibility
The author first saw war as an outlet for the desire for power, and later stated a firm view that war comes from the “habit of dividing.” The objection is that the desire for power is a near-constant among politicians and cannot explain why only a few choose war. [Inference] Scholarship stresses the security dilemma and information asymmetry (Fearon, 1995), leaders’ calculations of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and research suggesting that power reduces empathy and raises risk-taking (Keltner et al., 2003; replication varies). [Theory] Cases of women leaders who decided on war (Thatcher in the Falklands, Indira Gandhi in 1971, Golda Meir in the Yom Kippur War) were raised against a gender hypothesis, but the details rest on recollection. [Unverified]
The conclusion of the discussion is that the desire for power and the habit of dividing create and reinforce each other in a feedback loop. Neither can then be named the sole root. The habit of dividing is defensible as a psychological precondition of war but weak as a sole cause: humans always divide, most divisions do not lead to war, and war in turn deepens division. [Inference] Cooperation across boundaries therefore matters for peace, but lasting cooperation needs structures that guard against betrayal. [Inference]
On responsibility we agreed on the following. Where structures are firm, individual responsibility shrinks; where they are weak or breached, the responsibility of the person who breached them grows. Responsibility should be split into three levels: causal explanation, moral responsibility and the duty of improvement. Power carries responsibility, but those who carried out orders are not reduced to zero responsibility (Arendt, 1963). [Theory]
3. Over-Representation of Lawyers and Camp Politics
In the 22nd National Assembly, 61 members, or 20.3%, come from legal professions, the highest share in any general election, and one outlet calculated this as roughly 300 times over-representation relative to the population. [Verified] The claim that lawyers are conservative, however, found no support. According to a newspaper column, the People Power Party has 9 former prosecutors and the Democratic Party 23 lawyers, 14 of them from the Lawyers for a Democratic Society, and there are cases of lawyers from civic groups leading reform legislation. [Verified: column and interview] One must distinguish party-political conservatism from a professional disposition that respects precedent and procedure, and whether any such conservatism comes from selection or from training is undetermined. [Unverified]
The author asked whether electing legislators from occupational sectors, rather than lawyers, would ease camp politics, citing Switzerland as a model. Switzerland turns out not to use functional representation. Its 200-seat National Council is elected by proportional representation with cantons as constituencies, its 46-seat Council of States has two seats per canton (one for half-cantons), and its seven-member Federal Council is formed by party-based power sharing (concordance). [Verified] Functional representation is linked to corporatism, so the line of division may simply move from ideology to occupational interest, and deciding which occupations get how many seats becomes a new question of power. [Inference] The more common explanations of Korean camp politics are single-member plurality districts (Duverger, 1951) and a winner-take-all presidency (Linz, 1990). [Theory]
4. Correcting the Electoral System: Multi-Member Districts Plus Stronger Proportional Representation
The author holds that Korea should prevent two-party outcomes through a system that lets minorities win seats, meaning a combination of multi-member districts and stronger proportional representation. In 2023 the National Assembly’s political reform committee likewise considered combining an urban-rural mixed multi-member district system with regional or semi-linked proportional representation and open lists, and agreed on goals of higher proportionality and representativeness, a response to regional decline, less regionalism and more diversity. [Verified] This April the two main camps agreed to introduce multi-member districts for the first time in four constituencies in Gwangju for the June 3 local elections. [Verified] We did not confirm the outcome. [Unverified]
The design issues that decide success are as follows.
Satellite parties: critics say the semi-linked system collapsed into satellite parties of the two big parties and undermined its purpose of greater proportionality (opinion column). [Verified]
Assembly size: raising proportionality requires more seats or fewer district seats, which collides with calls to cut the number of members. [Verified]
A 2015 analysis noted that multi-member districts alone may entrench a two-party structure when one camp is weak. [Verified: one analyst’s view]
If linked proportional representation is strong, party vote shares largely set seat totals, so the role of multi-member districts lies less in proportionality than in local competition and easing regionalism. [Inference]
The winner-take-all character of presidential elections is not solved by assembly electoral rules and ties into constitutional reform (Linz, 1990). Even with many parties, parties can regroup into two coalition blocs. [Inference]
5. Regionalism
In the 22nd general election the People Power Party won all 25 seats in Daegu and North Gyeongsang and the Democratic Party won all 28 seats in the Honam region. The People Power Party won 34 of 40 seats in Busan, Ulsan and South Gyeongsang, and although it fielded candidates in every Honam constituency for the first time in 16 years, it lost them all. [Verified] At the same time, compared with the presidential election two years earlier, shifts of 10 to 20 percentage points occurred even in the Daegu–North Gyeongsang and Busan–Gyeongnam areas, and one analysis found safe progressive districts rising from 56 to 98 while safe conservative districts stayed near 71. [Verified] Regionalism is not fixed, but the two ends, Yeongnam and Honam, remain firm.
The electoral system acts less on voting dispositions than on how votes convert into seats, that is, on reducing the amplification of winner-take-all. [Inference] A system that rewards narrowly losing candidates was discussed as a way to induce parties to field candidates in rivals’ strongholds, but its effect is untested. [Unverified] Regional proportional lists raise local representation but may revive regional parties and institutionalize regionalism, so responding to regional decline and easing regionalism can conflict. [Inference] Because the author ranks jobs, medical care and education above community and identity, the case for regional representation rests on functional access, not identity; combining nationwide proportional representation with access guarantees would then be more consistent. [Inference] Giving regions a separate chamber, as Switzerland does, would need constitutional reform and raises the problem of over-representing small areas. [Inference]
The author’s early remark, “how can we pursue unification and globalization when we cannot even solve domestic regionalism,” was teasing; his actual direction is the opposite, that working on unification and globalization will dissolve regionalism. Research on superordinate goals reducing intergroup conflict supports this (Sherif et al., 1961). [Theory] Yet Korea has globalized for some thirty years while the East–West split stays firm; globalization can also divide regions into winners and losers and deepen internal fractures, and unification may create new regional fault lines. [Inference] The hypothesis remains untested. [Unverified]
6. Regional Decline and Living-Sphere Hubs
A seminar presentation put the capital region’s population share at a record 50.5% in 2024 and its share of new jobs at 74% (a professor’s figures, so they need checking against original data). [Verified] In a survey, 77% of non-capital local governments said the risk of regional decline is high, with the Gangwon region highest at 85.7% (a perception survey). [Verified] The extinction-risk index classifies an area as at risk when the ratio of women aged 20 to 39 to people aged 65 and over is below 0.5, assuming other variables do not act strongly. [Verified] Extinction, loss of function and population decline are therefore different problems.
The author has argued that transport should be developed to turn the whole country into a capital region, and after visiting Yanggu and Hwacheon he became convinced that four-lane roads could change those areas considerably. [Experience] Yet there is research showing that after the KTX opened, medical use shifted toward Seoul’s tertiary hospitals and away from hospitals in the catchment areas, and testimony that spending moved to Seoul as well; effects differ by sector. [Verified] Transport runs both ways and tends to carry demand from the weaker place to the stronger. [Inference] The defensible form is therefore not Seoul-ward metropolitanization but concentrating functions in hub cities and tying surrounding counties into their commuting, medical and school catchments. [Inference]
The author notes that central place theory held that better transport strengthens central places, and suggests that today’s communications may weaken that effect. But Korea combines top-tier internet with record concentration in the capital region, which cuts against that hypothesis. [Inference] Some functions, such as remote medicine and care, could work in the regions if regulation is loosened. [Inference] By central place theory’s threshold concept (Christaller, 1933), when a hub city’s population falls below the threshold, higher-order functions withdraw. [Theory]
By “diseconomies” the author means the state in which regional cities can no longer perform hub functions. The routes are three: insufficient scale, drawing-off by higher-order centers, and lack of fiscal and administrative capacity. The author judges the last to be the core, a judgment we could not test with data. [Unverified] If living-sphere hubs are the final goal, “preventing extinction” should be restated honestly as an orderly contraction of declining areas and strengthening of hubs. The efficiency logic that budgets cannot be poured into areas that are hard to administer is realistic, but residents of the areas left behind need a minimum safety net of health and transport access. [Inference] The governor of the Bank of Korea was reported to propose concentrating policy support on two to six core regional hubs, and discussions of regional mergers such as Daejeon–South Chungcheong and Gwangju–South Jeolla have appeared. [Verified]
7. The Capital-Region Interest Structure: Legislators’ Assets and the Voting Majority
The author suspected that political forces holding land and buildings in central Seoul might be blocking balanced regional development, and extended the idea to questions of power and the electoral system. According to an analysis by the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice of asset disclosures (a civic group’s data), of 299 members of the 22nd Assembly, 234 own homes; of the 299 homes reported, 134 (44.8%) are in Seoul and 61 are in the four Gangnam-area districts. Average real estate assets were 1.95 billion won, about 4.7 times the national average. Members with homes in those four districts number 20 in the Democratic Party and 36 in the People Power Party. [Verified] This reads as a structure of the Assembly as a whole rather than the doing of one force. [Inference]
Between ownership and obstruction, however, lie two unproven steps. [Unverified] There are alternative explanations. The capital region holds 122 of the 254 district seats, nearly half, so there is an electoral incentive to respond to the interests of homeowning voters there regardless of any member’s own assets. [Verified + calculation] Whether balanced development was tried and failed or was obstructed calls for different remedies, and the regions also have landowners seeking development gains. [Inference] Testing this would require matching votes on balanced-development bills with members’ real estate holdings, which has not been done. [Unverified] A bill to require blind trusts for real estate, aimed at conflicts of interest, was scrapped in the 21st Assembly and reintroduced in the 22nd, where discussion is stalled. [Verified]
The author’s summary is this: both the property interests of individual legislators and the interests of the capital-region majority of voters should be cited; the proposal to correct them first through the electoral system should follow; and it is a problem the government must solve for the future. Two additions apply. First, the actors must be separated: the executive handles fiscal decentralization, hub investment, transport and the placement of functions; the legislature handles electoral rules and conflict-of-interest prevention; the constitution handles any regional-representation mechanism. Second, “first” means logical priority, closer to the cause, not first in time; administrative measures should run in parallel. [Inference]
8. Figures on the Costs of Capital-Region Overconcentration
A 2023 Bank of Korea issue note reports that 50.6% of the population lives in the capital region, which is 11.8% of the land, and that the 2021 total fertility rate was 0.76 in the capital region, 0.81 in metropolitan cities and 0.94 in the provinces. It judged that young people’s concentration in the capital region lowers fertility outside it and delays births within it, lowering overall fertility and growth, and estimated that if the concentration continues the capital region’s share will rise by 2.5 percentage points in thirty years. [Verified: Bank of Korea estimate] In 2023 the fertility rate was 0.55 in Seoul, 0.66 in Busan and 0.69 in Incheon, with Jeonnam and Sejong highest at 0.97. [Verified] Another Bank of Korea report estimated that bringing several policy factors up to the OECD average could raise fertility by up to 0.845, and one commentary cited that lowering urban concentration to the OECD average would add 0.41. [Verified: model-based estimates] Of the top 100 firms by market capitalization, 79 are headquartered in the capital region, and Seoul natives are 16% of graduates but 32% of Seoul National University entrants. [Verified] On the regional side, a projection says that by 2042 the number of municipalities with fewer than 10,000 working-age people will rise from none today to 15. [Verified: Bank of Korea estimate]
The limits are clear. These figures entangle correlation and causation, depend on model assumptions and lean toward costs. Because they were not weighed against benefits such as the capital region’s productivity and wage premium, the general claim that agglomeration diseconomies outweigh gains is not yet proven. We could not find figures for traffic congestion costs, housing costs relative to income, commuting time or concentration of risk. [Unverified]
9. Conclusion
The decline of regional hubs is best described not as a moral failing of individuals or a plot by one political force, but as a structure in which legislators’ property interests and the interests of the capital-region majority are built into the Assembly and the electoral system; that framing fits the facts and withstands rebuttal better. The correction should begin with a combination of multi-member districts and proportional representation, designed after settling the conflict between easing regionalism and securing regional representation, and run in parallel with the executive’s fiscal decentralization and hub investment. The goal is not to maintain the population of every locality but to maintain the jobs, medical care and education functions of hub cities and the access of surrounding areas. For this argument to stand as a column, the unverified items below must first be filled in.
10. Summary of Evidence Status
References
Web sources are cited on the basis of search-result summaries, and in some cases the full text was not read. Theoretical works were mentioned from recollection during the discussion, so their bibliographic details need rechecking. Titles of Korean-language sources are given in English translation with the original outlet and date.
A. Web sources
[1] The Fact. Statistics on members of the 22nd National Assembly (lawyers 20.3%). https://news.tf.co.kr/read/ogmeta/2265262.htm
[2] Law Times. “One in five is a lawyer… election rate up 10 points from the 21st.” https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/news/197523
[3] Munhwa Ilbo. Column by editorial writer Lee Hyeon-jong (rise of lawyer-members). https://www.munhwa.com/article/11496097
[4] Law Times. “Leading on livelihood issues: from People’s Solidarity” (interviews with first-term lawyer-members). https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/news/199290
[5] swissinfo (2023). Le parlement suisse pour les nuls. https://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/politics/le-parlement-suisse-pour-les-nuls-elections-federales-22-octobre-2023-suisse/48531240
[6] Stojanović, N. (2016). Party, regional and linguistic proportionality under majoritarian rules: Swiss Federal Council elections. Swiss Political Science Review, 22(1), 41–58. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:129698
[7] Report on the Assembly’s political reform committee and electoral-system proposals (Feb. 7, 2023). https://kbmaeil.com/article/202302070354355
[8] Pressian (May 3, 2023). How can the hostile symbiosis of the two big parties be changed? https://pressian.com/pages/articles/2023050314053438124
[9] Nocut News (2015). Calls to reform the electoral district system grow as factions weigh their interests. https://nocutnews.co.kr/news/4206157
[10] Kyunghyang Shinmun (Apr. 17, 2026). Ruling and opposition parties agree on first multi-member districts in four Gwangju constituencies. https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202604171723001
[11] OhmyNews. First multi-member districts in four Gwangju constituencies. https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Series/series_premium_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003225699
[12] Segye Ilbo (Apr. 11, 2024). “Divided east and west, not only north and south”: regionalism stark again in the 22nd general election. https://www.segye.com/newsView/20240411525327
[13] Kyunghyang Shinmun (Apr. 11, 2024). Comparing presidential and general election vote shares. https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202404111528001
[14] Daum-carried article (Apr. 26, 2024). Safe progressive districts overtake conservative, 98 to 71. https://v.daum.net/v/20240426133136908
[15] ZDNet Korea (Apr. 2, 2026). AI as the last weapon for areas at risk of extinction (National Assembly seminar). https://zdnet.co.kr/view/?no=20260402153156
[16] Seoul Shinmun (Jan. 4, 2026). Capital–non-capital population gap of 1.04 million. https://m.seoul.co.kr/news/2026/01/04/20260104500062
[17] The Fact (Jan. 19, 2026). Federation of Korean Industries: 77% of non-capital local governments say risk of regional decline is high. https://news.tf.co.kr/read/economy/2283523.htm
[18] Money Today (Jan. 5, 2026). Balanced development: how Korea lives in 2026. https://www.mt.co.kr/policy/2026/01/05/2026010213437816285
[19] Kyeonggi Ilbo (Nov. 23, 2020). Even the capital region faces extinction risk (definition of the risk index). https://www.kyeonggi.com/article/202011231146445
[20] Journal of the Korean Society for Railway 13(2) (2010). Changes in cancer patients’ medical use after the introduction of the KTX (authors not confirmed). https://koreascience.kr/article/JAKO201031559289813.pdf
[21] Nocut News. Possible straw effect of the GTX (interview on the KTX case). https://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/6345505
[22] Kyeonggi Ilbo (May 20, 2024). The KTX opening and concentration in Seoul. https://kyeonggi.com/article/20240520580347
[23] Segye Ilbo (Nov. 4, 2025). Analysis of real estate assets of 22nd Assembly members (CCEJ). https://www.segye.com/newsView/20251104507431
[24] Hankyung Magazine (Nov. 4, 2025). Analysis of 22nd Assembly members’ real estate assets. https://magazine.hankyung.com/business/article/202511043397b
[25] Newstomato (Nov. 4, 2025). 22nd Assembly members’ real estate averages 1.95 billion won. https://newstomato.com/ReadNews.aspx?no=1280308
[26] Newdaily (Nov. 4, 2025). Members renting out homes on jeonse leases. https://biz.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2025/11/04/2025110400245.amp.html
[27] Newstapa. “People with Gangnam apartments make policy”: blind trusts for real estate. https://newstapa.org/article/T9U8E
[28] Metro Seoul (Nov. 2, 2023). Bank of Korea: youth concentration in the capital region deepens (BOK issue note). https://www.metroseoul.co.kr/article/20231102500609
[29] Seoul Shinmun (Nov. 2, 2023). Bank of Korea report on youth concentration in the capital region. https://m.seoul.co.kr/news/2023/11/02/20231102500086
[30] Block Media (2023). Bank of Korea report “Ultra-low fertility and a super-aged society.” https://www.blockmedia.co.kr/archives/419998
[31] Maeil Shinmun (Jun. 21, 2024). Birth-rate measures will not work unless capital-region concentration is solved. https://www.imaeil.com/page/view/2024062113053316323
[32] Newsis (Aug. 26, 2024). Bank of Korea report on college-entrance competition. https://www.newsis.com/view/NISX20240826_0002863161
[33] Segye Ilbo (Sep. 14, 2025). Bank of Korea BOK Economic Research on municipal working-age populations. https://www.segye.com/newsView/20250914505128
[34] Seoul Shinmun (Jul. 25, 2025). “We leave because there are no jobs worth taking”: 54% of young people crowd the capital region. https://m.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20250725005006
[35] Baby News. Report on remarks by Bank of Korea Governor Rhee Chang-yong (fostering hub cities). https://www.ibabynews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=128067
[36] Segye Ilbo (Dec. 22, 2024). Regional total fertility rates (Korea Institute of Public Administration report). https://www.segye.com/newsView/20241222507277
B. Theoretical works (bibliographic details to be rechecked)
Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press.
Bushman, B. J. (2002). Does venting anger feed or extinguish the flame? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(6), 724–731.
Christaller, W. (1933). Die zentralen Orte in Süddeutschland. Gustav Fischer.
Duverger, M. (1951). Les partis politiques. Armand Colin.
Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review, 110(2), 265–284.
Linz, J. J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, 1(1), 51–69.
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. University of Oklahoma.
