When Britain made the Brexit decision a long time ago, I was puzzled. I thought integration was the extreme flow and communication of the division of labor. I was very sensitive to such issues regarding the unification of the Korean Peninsula, so I wrote a brief column. I also wrote columns about future tragedies caused by the neglect of the real economy, such as Korea's manufacturing industry, and the enlargement of the financial economy, such as the financial industry, and today I write columns to improve the imbalance development of the country. All of these were issues that had to be addressed in an integrated manner between the United Kingdom and Korea. In a world where a single Korean citizen was concerned about Britain's problems, Britain had many problems of division.
The Revenge of Forgotten Lands
— How Territorial Imbalance Is Breaking the World —
Lee Hyeong-chun | Columnist & Geopolitical Analyst
1. I Was Trying to Unite — Why Were They Tearing Apart?
Much of my life has been devoted to connecting what has been severed. My work toward reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula — bridging two worlds separated by history and ideology — has been the orienting purpose of my existence. So when, in 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union, I found myself genuinely bewildered.
In a world where unity is so difficult to achieve, why would anyone voluntarily destroy what had already been built? What could drive a nation to dismantle decades of integrated trade, law, and shared purpose?
After much reflection, I arrived at an answer. Brexit was not a verdict on Brussels. It was a verdict on London. More precisely, it was history's invoice — long overdue — for a decades-long strategy of concentrating national growth in one corner of the country while quietly abandoning the rest.
2. Thatcher Divided Britain First
Margaret Thatcher's neoliberal revolution restructured the British economy from its foundations. The 1986 "Big Bang" deregulation of London's financial markets elevated the City into a global capital hub. Wealth expanded at a rate rarely seen in peacetime.
But the fruits of that expansion did not travel beyond the M25 motorway. In the same years, the English North was experiencing something entirely different. Coal mines closed. Steel mills fell silent. Shipyards were dismantled. The 1984 miners' strike — and its brutal suppression — was not merely a labor dispute. It was the funeral of a regional civilization.
When a mine shuts down, the hardware store closes. The diner closes. The surgery closes. The school closes. Manchester, Middlesbrough, Sunderland, the Welsh valleys — these communities were slowly erased from the national map. Nothing replaced them. And the state looked elsewhere.
The Brexit vote made the geography of abandonment visible. London voted 60% Remain. The industrial North and Wales voted 60-70% Leave. This was not one nation voting. It was two Britains, finally forced to choose.
The Leave voters were not impoverished by the EU. The EU had nothing to do with their decline. But anger does not seek precise causes. It seeks the nearest available target.
3. The Same Disease in Different Countries
This pattern is not uniquely British. Across the major democracies of the late twentieth century, a similar logic took hold: concentrate investment, talent, and infrastructure in a few high-growth zones; let the rest manage.
Look at the American Rust Belt. Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cleveland — cities that once built the world's machines now struggle with opioid epidemics and structural unemployment. In 2016, Donald Trump channeled that anger toward immigrants and China. The targets were wrong. But the anger was real. What destroyed Rust Belt workers was decades of neglect in Washington and extraction on Wall Street — not the migrant worker at the border.
France's Marine Le Pen phenomenon shares the same roots. While Paris's grandes écoles elites designed European integration, the small towns of Normandy and the factory floors of Lorraine were quietly collapsing. The Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) erupted over a fuel tax, but the underlying pressure had been building for decades: a France organized entirely around Paris, indifferent to its periphery.
In all three cases, the structural logic is identical. Resources and opportunity concentrate in a metropolitan core. The rest of the national territory is left behind. The abandoned people's rage will, eventually, find expression. Brexit, Trump, Le Pen — these are the names that rage takes when it finally speaks.
4. A Warning to Korea
I watch South Korea with a growing sense of unease.
More than half of South Korea's population is now concentrated in Seoul and its surrounding metropolitan area. Regional depopulation is no longer a sociologist's projection — it is lived reality. Elementary schools in rural South Jeolla Province are closing. Young people leave for the capital. Villages grow old and then disappear. This is not the natural consequence of urbanization. It is the designed consequence of policy.
For decades, Korea's economic strategy has centered on the capital region and its major conglomerates. Everything gravitates toward where Samsung is, where the ministries are, where the elite universities cluster. The provinces have functioned not as beneficiaries of national growth, but as suppliers — of labor, of tax revenue, of human capital that flows in one direction and does not return.
The England of the North yesterday is the Korea of the regions today. If the trajectory does not change, Brexit-style fury will emerge in Korea under a different name.
5. Destroy the Internal Division of Labor, and the External Follows
An economic insight is essential here. Brexit ultimately destroyed the European division of labor — the integrated supply chains and cooperative structures built over decades collapsed against the border it created. Britain continues to pay that cost.
But where did the seed of that destruction come from? It came from Thatcher's prior dismantling of Britain's internal division of labor. The balance between London (finance) and the North (manufacturing) was broken when one side was sacrificed. That internal imbalance, compounding over thirty years, erupted as external disintegration.
This is the most lethal consequence of territorial imbalance strategy. A nation that divides itself internally will choose division externally. Internal integration is not merely a social good — it is the precondition for external integration's survival.
6. What Korean Reunification Must Not Forget
I have made Korean reunification a lifelong project. The work has taught me, above all else, how arduous it is to connect what has been severed — how much time, trust, and patience the restoration of severed relationships demands.
Brexit taught me the inverse lesson with equal force. How foolish it is to sever what has already been joined. And — more urgently — how critical the design that follows unification must be.
Should the Korean Peninsula reunify, we will have before us a rare opportunity to design a national territory from something close to the ground up. If we squander that opportunity by once again concentrating development in one region while abandoning another, we will reproduce the Brexit tragedy at peninsular scale.
Reunification does not end with opening a border. It requires a design in which every territory becomes a center — in which no land is expendable. Sustainable integration demands that the geography of abandonment never be allowed to take root. Brexit is an expensive lesson in what happens when it does.
Forgotten lands always speak. Through ballots, through streets, through the kind of votes that shake history. The responsibility of politics — and the duty of the state — is to listen before the speaking begins.
— Lee Hyeong-chun
