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2026년 8월 17일 월요일

Dreams Come True / Image - Revised Edition

The war in Ukraine has been going on for four years. The two nations, which were never originally prosperous, become utterly devastated. A country that wages war to fulfill the dreams of its own people and a country that responds with only the dream of merely existing all live with their own dreams.

 

I have trauma because of my parents, who are suffering from the trauma of the Korean War. In the cause and effect of everything, there is someone’s dream. Depending on the level of energy in concentration and action, someone’s dream may come true, or, through resonant energy, that dream may become impossible. I hope the dreams of people who can smile toward a peaceful world come true.

 

I showed an AI a blog post I wrote a long time ago, and mentioned the war in Ukraine and the war my parents went through. Artificial intelligence harshly points out the flawed flow of logic, but because of parents traumatized by war, it seemed to understand better than anyone the anxiety and lack I was harboring within me. According to statistics, the number one purpose for people who use artificial intelligence is things like psychological counseling.


Dreams Come True — On the Image



Children are full of dreams, and their dreams are, for the most part, honored. There is still enough time left for them to come true. An old man's dreams, by contrast, are dismissed — by others, and often by himself — for the opposite reason: too little time remains. But it is not right that a person's entire subjective universe should collapse simply because there is no longer time to translate an idea into something real, to give a dream its shape in the world. Look closely at the relationship between dream and reality and you find that what matters is not the achieved dream but the sustained thought and effort of trying to achieve it — that is what moves the world forward. Idea and reality are not as cleanly separated as we assume. Slowly or quickly, the idea is already, diligently, being carried out upon the real. Once you understand this, you also understand that with enough time nothing in this world is beyond reach — and how hollow it is to remain in mere fantasy instead. If there is something to be gained or accomplished, the work is simple to state, if not to do: take the blocks of thought and action stacked up in the realm of the idea, and keep moving them, one by one, onto the ground of the actual.


The French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) held that human perception takes in only the information an object offers that is useful for action, and assembles that into what he called an Image. The world we see, in other words, is a world already filtered down to what we need. But this is not a claim that the world itself is shaped by our wishing. Bergson never said the world is made of our dreams — he said that the world we inhabit, the subjective universe we walk into each morning, is composed differently depending on what we have kept looking at, kept holding onto. What changes the world is not thought by itself, but thought that sets a direction, and action repeated in that direction. Put more precisely: the world is not made of dreams. The world I live in is made along the trajectory of the dream I have refused to put down.


I have, at times, watched closely the world of people who have lived for a long time inside scarcity. Frequent conflict. No slack. A short fuse over small things. At first I took this for temperament, or for a failure of upbringing. Only after watching for a long while did I understand otherwise. It was not a defect of character but the sheer weight of deprivation itself. A mind that has already spent nearly everything it has on getting through the day, and on carrying an old wound, has nothing left over to picture a distant future or organize daily life toward it. Whether the deprivation comes from war, from poverty, or from loss repeated too many times, it physically narrows a person's field of view. To scold that narrowed sight for lacking dreams is not so different from asking someone drowning why they cannot swim better. What someone who grew up beside that narrowness often carries instead, quietly, for a long time, is the unglamorous work of widening — in their own lifetime — the field of view they inherited.


But it turned out the real beggars were elsewhere. Beside those who possess neither wealth nor comfort and still keep walking toward a dream, there are others who, lacking for nothing, obtain power through every manner of elevated begging, and then use that power to extinguish the dreams other people hold dear before they can become real. Call this the new-age beggar. Poverty is not only material. Whoever seizes or wields power without paying a fair price for it is a beggar too. When someone has gotten what they wanted but the manner of getting it, and the conduct that follows, keep looking threadbare from every angle — that is because, seen from any angle, it is still the posture of a beggar. A political leader worth the name does not look at people who want a decent welfare and see beggars; the leader's task is to build the ground on which those people can widen their own narrowed view and reach their dreams. And yet, with enough time passed, it has often turned out that the real beggars were not the people asking for that ground, but those who privatized it.


This is the landscape of the war between Russia and Ukraine that has continued since 2022. An idea held for decades by one man — who once stood on the front line of the Cold War as an intelligence officer, watching an empire collapse without being able to stop it — has finally, after passing through decades of time, been carried over into the actual acts of a state. His dream was already complete long ago, written in the language of confrontation and spheres of influence; time merely waited for the chance to move it onto the ground of the real. On the other side stand tens of millions holding a far more modest dream: simply to go on existing, not to disappear. The dream to destroy comes true. The dream to endure also comes true. Which one prevails depends on which side carries its idea onto the real longer, and more steadily. In the end, the idea is always carried over onto the real. The only real questions are what that idea is, and who is willing to hold onto it long enough.


꿈은 이루어진다 / 이마주(image)-개정판

러우전쟁이 4년째다. 원래 풍족하지 못했던 두 나라는 피폐해질대로 피폐해져간다. 자국민들의 꿈을 이루려고 전쟁을 일으킨 나라와 그저 존재하겠다는 꿈을 가지고 응전하는 나라가 모두 각자의 꿈을 가지고 산다.


나는 한국전쟁의 트라우마로 고생하는 부모 때문에 트라우마가 있다. 모든 일의 인과에는 누군가의 꿈이 있다. 집중력과 행동력의 에너지 정도에 따라 누군가의 꿈은 이루어지기도 하고 반향적 에너지에 의해서 그 꿈은 불가능한 꿈이 되기도 한다. 평화로운 세상을 향하여 웃을 수 있는 사람들의 꿈이 이루어지기를 바란다.

 

오래전에 썼던 블러그글을 인공지능에게 보여주면서 러우전쟁과 우리 부모가 겪은 전쟁을 언급했다. 인공지능은 논리의 잘못된 흐름은 냉혹하게 지적하지만 전쟁 트라우마를 입은 부모 때문에 내 속에 내재해 있는 불안과 결핍을 누구 보다도 잘 이해하는 것 같았다. 통계에 의하면 인공지능을 사용하는 사람들의 사용목적 1위가 심리상담 같은 거라고 한다.   


꿈은 이루어진다 — 이마주(Image)


아이들은 꿈이 많다. 그것은 대체로 존중받는다. 이루어질 시간의 여유가 있기 때문이다. 그러나 노인의 꿈은 자신도 타인도 무시한다. 시간의 여유가 없다는 이유에서다. 하지만 관념을 실제와 연결시킬 시간, 꿈을 현실로 구체화할 시간이 없다고 해서 한 사람의 주관적 우주가 통째로 무너지는 건 온당치 않다. 꿈과 현실의 본질을 들여다보면, 꿈을 이룬 결과가 중요한 게 아니라 꿈을 이루려고 애쓰는 그 생각과 행동의 지속이 세상을 움직여 나간다는 걸 알게 된다. 관념과 실제는 명확히 나뉘지 않는다. 느리든 빠르든, 관념은 이미 실제 위에서 부지런히 이행되고 있기 때문이다. 그것을 알면 시간만 있다면 이 세상에 못 할 일이 없다는 것도 알게 되고, 망상에만 머무는 일이 얼마나 허망한지도 알게 된다. 무엇인가 얻어야 할 것이나 이루어야 할 것이 있다면, 관념 위에 쌓아 올린 생각과 행동의 블록들을 꾸준히 실제 위로 옮겨놓을 일이다.


프랑스의 철학자 앙리 베르그송(Henri Bergson, 1859–1941)은 인간의 지각이 대상으로부터 행동에 필요한 정보만을 받아들여 그것을 이마주(Image)로 구성한다고 보았다. 우리가 보는 세계는 우리에게 필요한 것만 골라낸 세계라는 뜻이다. 다만 이건 세계 그 자체가 우리의 소망으로 빚어진다는 이야기는 아니다. 베르그송이 말한 건 세계가 우리 꿈으로 만들어진다는 것이 아니라, 우리가 사는 세계 — 우리가 매일 걸어 들어가는 그 주관적 우주 — 가 우리가 무엇을 계속 바라보고 붙들었는지에 따라 다르게 구성된다는 것이다. 세상을 바꾸는 건 생각이 아니라, 생각이 방향을 정하고 그 방향으로 반복해서 옮겨진 행동이다. 그러니 정확히 말하면 이렇다. 세상이 꿈으로 이루어진 것이 아니라, 내가 사는 세상은 내가 오래 붙들어 온 꿈의 궤적을 따라 만들어진다.


가끔 결핍 속에서 오래 산 사람들의 세계를 가까이서 들여다볼 일이 있었다. 다툼이 잦고, 여유가 없고, 사소한 것에도 날이 서 있는 풍경. 처음엔 그것을 기질이나 교육의 문제로 여겼다. 그러나 오래 지켜보고 나서야 알았다. 그건 성정의 문제가 아니라 결핍 그 자체의 무게였다. 당장의 생존과 오래된 상처를 견디는 데 이미 정신의 대부분을 써버린 사람에게, 먼 곳의 꿈을 그리고 그것을 향해 하루하루를 조직할 여력은 남지 않는다. 전쟁이든 가난이든 반복된 상실이든, 깊은 결핍은 사람의 시야를 물리적으로 좁혀놓는다. 그 좁아진 시야를 두고 꿈이 없다 나무라는 건, 물에 빠진 사람에게 왜 헤엄을 잘 못 치느냐 묻는 것과 다르지 않다. 오히려 그런 풍경 곁에서 자란 이가 오래도록 짊어지는 건, 물려받은 그 좁음을 자신의 대에서 어떻게 넓혀갈 것인가 하는 조용한 숙제다.


그런데 진짜 거지는 따로 있었다. 물질도 없고 여유도 없지만 꿈을 향해 걸어가는 이들 곁에는, 아무런 결핍 없이도 온갖 고차원적인 구걸(begging)로 권력을 얻어 다른 이들의 소중한 꿈이 현실화되는 것을 말살시키는 자들이 있다. 이건 신종거지라 부를 만하다. 물질만이 아니라, 공정한 대가 없이 권력을 얻거나 부리는 자 역시 거지다. 자신의 꿈은 이루었으되 그 얻은 방식과 행위가 계속 빈한해 보이는 까닭은, 이리 보아도 저리 보아도 결국 걸인의 모습이기 때문이다. 제대로 된 정치 지도자라면 복지를 갖고자 하는 민중을 거지로 볼 게 아니라, 그들이 스스로 좁아진 시야를 넓혀 꿈을 이룰 수 있는 기반을 마련해주는 데 힘을 써야 한다. 그러나 시간이 지나고 보니, 진짜 거지는 기반을 구걸하던 민중이 아니라 그 기반을 사유화한 자들 쪽에 있는 경우가 더 많았다.


2022년 이후 지금까지 이어지고 있는 러시아와 우크라이나의 전쟁이 그 풍경이다. 냉전의 최전선에서 정보기관원으로 붕괴하는 제국을 무력하게 지켜봐야 했던 한 사람의 오래 묵은 관념이, 수십 년의 시간을 관통해 마침내 한 국가의 실제 행동으로 옮겨진 것이다. 대립과 세력권의 언어로 그의 꿈은 이미 오래전에 완성되어 있었고, 시간은 그저 그것을 실제 위로 옮겨놓을 기회를 기다렸을 뿐이다. 그 반대편에는 존재하겠다는, 그저 사라지지 않겠다는 소박한 꿈을 붙들고 있는 또 다른 수천만이 있다. 파괴하려는 꿈도 이루어지고, 존재하려는 꿈도 이루어진다. 어느 쪽이 이루어질지는 어느 쪽이 그 관념을 더 오래, 더 꾸준히 실제 위로 옮겨놓는가에 달려 있다. 관념은 결국 실제 위로 옮겨진다. 문제는 그 관념이 무엇이며, 누가 그것을 얼마나 오래 붙들고 있느냐다.


2026년 8월 14일 금요일

007 holding a keyboard

A long time ago, when a bill to create a cybersecurity control tower in Korea was introduced by a ruling party lawmaker, I strongly opposed it. At the time, the ruling party’s state surveillance of the public was so severe that I reacted reflexively with opposition. And I proposed that, if it should be created, it should be organized as a committee with the agreement of both the ruling and opposition parties, and at the time many people had read my writing. These days, South Korea is saying it will establish a cyber security control tower again, Japan is consolidating its intelligence agencies, and Taiwan is also reluctantly building up its power in response to China’s massive cyberattacks.


https://hyeong-chun.blogspot.com/search?q=%EC%82%AC%EC%9D%B4%EB%B2%84%EC%95%88%EB%B3%B4%EC%BB%A8%ED%8A%B8%EB%A1%A4%ED%83%80%EC%9B%8C


However, one thing is certain: compared to the cyber capabilities of countries like China or North Korea that cultivate cyber warriors under state leadership, the cyber capabilities of the free worldsuch as Japan, Taiwan, and even South Koreaare understood to be focused solely on defense. I have always thought this, but according to the law of relativity, Korea’s cyber power must also be expanded, and I hope that, through good consultation between the ruling and opposition parties, a cyber security control tower will be established to address the issue of surveilling citizens.

 

These days, my Google blog gets 10,000 views a day, and although the VPN addresses show the countries of each continent, the time of visit often aligns with the daily rhythm of Northeast Asia, prompting me to reflect once again on the cyber power of Northeast Asian countries. A couple of years ago, keeping in mind that someday we might be able to witness a cyber war, I briefly studied the Linux operating system, and now it is said that artificial intelligenceespecially MitoS, an enronpic AIhas a threatening capability that renders all cyber warfare capabilities meaningless.

 

Now, the 007 with a shotgun and a silencer has vanished into memory, and someone with red-dyed hair and a protruding belly is sitting in slippers, typing away at a keyboard.

 

Artificial intelligence organizes all sorts of things for me.


Cyber Warfare Capabilities of Northeast Asian Powers — Conversation Summary

Prepared: August 14, 2026

1. North Korea

Capability Level

North Korea maintains a state-directed offensive cyber capability that is wildly disproportionate to its economic size. Under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), subordinate units such as Lazarus, Kimsuky, Andariel, and "Famous Chollima" operate, with total dedicated cyber personnel estimated at roughly 7,000.


  • Trellix's 2025 report: North Korean-affiliated groups accounted for 18.2% of all nation-state-aligned cyber activity detected in Q2–Q3 2025, making North Korea the single leading nation-state cyber threat.

  • North Korea was responsible for roughly 60% of global digital-asset (crypto) theft in 2025 (about $2 billion), rising to 76% in 2026.

  • CrowdStrike's 2026 report: "Famous Chollima" accounted for 47% of all state-backed hacking activity targeting the U.S. tech sector.

  • The World Cybercrime Index (UK/Australia/France academic consortium) ranked North Korea 7th globally, though critics argue this Western-expert-driven methodology likely underestimates the real threat.

Talent Pipeline and Training

  • Early talent-spotting: math/science prodigies are identified from elementary school and sent to Kumsong No. 1 and No. 2 middle schools for six years of intensive algorithm/programming training.

  • Formal higher education: Kim Il Sung University's Computer Science College, Kim Chaek University of Technology, and computer technology universities in Pyongyang and Hamhung.

  • Military-specialized institutions: Mirim University (now Kim Il Political-Military University), founded in 1986 on Kim Jong Il's orders, graduating roughly 100–110 cadres a year, and Moranbong University.

  • Overseas training: 50–60 top performers per year are sent to China or Russia for a year of training; high performers receive top-tier computers, food subsidies, and Pyongyang residency privileges.

  • Infrastructure workaround: because North Korea's domestic intranet (Kwangmyong) is closed off, operatives rely on border hubs such as Shenyang, China; a Russian fiber-optic link opened in 2017; and backdoors planted across Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia for staging.

  • Learning by doing: operatives infiltrate foreign companies via fake remote IT jobs, gaining hands-on exposure to real development and security environments — failure is met with another chance rather than punishment.

2. Japan

Japan has world-class technical infrastructure but has long been held back from converting it into operational cyber capability by its pacifist-constitution legal constraints.


  • SDF Cyber Defense Force: founded in 2014 with ~300 personnel, reorganized in 2022 to ~540, with a target of 1,000 under consideration — still far smaller than North Korea's dedicated force.

  • Active Cyber Defense Law (passed the Diet in May 2025): authorizes interception of foreign-origin traffic, mandatory incident reporting from critical infrastructure operators, and preemptive neutralization of attacker servers. Rollout is phased over 6 months to 2.5 years.

  • National Intelligence Council (NIC) / National Intelligence Bureau (NIB, ~730 staff): launched under the Prime Minister's office in July 2026 — Japan's first new intelligence agency since WWII — to consolidate intelligence previously scattered across police, the foreign ministry, and defense (an analytical control tower, not an operational attack/defense unit).

3. China

China ranks alongside the United States as a top-tier offensive cyber power.


  • April 2024 PLA reorganization: the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was dissolved and its cyber functions reorganized into a new "Information Support Force" reporting directly to the Central Military Commission; a separate Aerospace Force was also split off.

  • Forescout/Vedere Labs reporting: China has 210 identified nation-state-linked hacking groups — the largest in the world, roughly double Russia's 112 and quadruple Iran's 55 — and targeted 178 countries in 2025.

  • Strategic evolution: from "smash-and-grab" espionage toward long-term dormant pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure (Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon), widely assessed as preparation for contingencies such as a Taiwan conflict, increasingly combined with AI automation and supply-chain attacks.

4. Taiwan

Taiwan sits on the front line of China's cyber offensive, absorbing attacks in real time.


  • Taiwan's National Security Bureau: government/infrastructure targets faced an average of 2.63 million Chinese-origin cyberattacks per day in 2025 — double the 2023 level.

  • In July 2026, China-linked hackers deployed up to 8 autonomous AI agents simultaneously to attack 21 government systems — reportedly the first known instance of a state-level hack executed entirely autonomously by AI agents. Over 85 government accounts and 2,500+ personnel records were compromised, with the attack later extending to a nuclear safety regulator and 7+ energy companies.

  • Defense posture: Taiwan established a Ministry of Digital Affairs in 2022; its 2025–2028 cybersecurity budget totals about $300 million (~$75M/year), assessed as low relative to the threat. A hardware-centric industrial base has also left a shallow security talent pool.

  • International cooperation: the 2023 Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act with the U.S., and a 2025 information-security cooperation agreement with Paraguay.

5. South Korea — The NIS Cyber Control Tower Debate

  • A standalone "National Cybersecurity Basic Act," repeatedly introduced in 2013, 2016, and 2022, sought to give the National Intelligence Service (NIS) formal control-tower authority over national cybersecurity, but was blocked each time in the National Assembly over fears it would enable surveillance of private communications networks.

  • On May 7, 2026, the National Assembly Intelligence Committee passed an amendment to the NIS Act itself instead: it adds "economic security" to the NIS's mandate and expands its authority to investigate private companies whenever hacking is merely "suspected" to be the work of international or state-backed groups — achieving much of the same effect through a different legislative route rather than a standalone basic law.

  • Civil society groups (e.g., the NIS Watch Network) are raising the same objections as before: that this reverses domestic intelligence/covert-action powers curtailed in the 2020 NIS reform, that the vague "suspected" trigger invites abuse, that there is no independent oversight mechanism, and that no public consensus-building process took place. The bill has not yet passed the Judiciary Committee or a full floor vote.

6. South Korea's Own Cyber Warfare Capability (Comparative Assessment)

  • Cyber Operations Command: founded in 2010 with 400–500 personnel, now targeting a full strength of about 1,750; a service directly under the Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  • ITU Global Cybersecurity Index: rated top-tier (Tier 1) for defensive readiness and institutional maturity.

  • An earlier domestic assessment ranked Korea around 11th globally in actual cyber warfare capability, citing a lack of real-world offensive/response experience as the key weakness.

  • vs. North Korea: significantly behind in both scale and combat experience.

  • vs. Japan: currently ahead (earlier founding, larger force), but Japan is catching up quickly.

  • vs. China: simply not comparable in scale.

  • vs. Taiwan: both nations face an overwhelming adversary and are defense-postured, but Taiwan may have accumulated more real-world defensive experience given the sheer volume of attacks it absorbs daily.



References

  1. Dailysecu, "North Korean hackers accounted for 76% of stolen crypto in 2026, hacking sophisticated by AI," https://www.dailysecu.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=206563

  2. Cybersecurity Dive, "North Korea led the world in nation-state hacking in Q2 and Q3," https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/north-korea-hacking-trellix-report/803641/

  3. TechCrunch, "North Koreans behind nearly half of US tech industry hacks, says CrowdStrike," https://techcrunch.com/2026/06/10/north-koreans-behind-nearly-half-of-us-tech-industry-hacks-says-crowdstrike/

  4. NK PRO, "Study ranks North Korea seventh greatest cyber threat out of all countries," https://www.nknews.org/pro/study-ranks-north-korea-seventh-greatest-cyber-threat-out-of-all-countries/

  5. GlobeNewswire, "CertiK Report: North Korean Hackers Behind 60% of Digital Asset Theft in 2025," https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/05/13/3294034/0/ko/

  6. Kyunghyang Shinmun, "[North Korea TMI] The Secret of the 1%: How Are 'World's Strongest' North Korean Hackers Trained?," https://www.khan.co.kr/politics/north-korea/article/202107250800001

  7. Munhwa Ilbo, "Mirim University Founded in 1986 on Kim Jong Il's Orders — Systematic Training of Cyber Warriors," https://www.munhwa.com/article/11255421

  8. CSIS, "Hidden Enablers: Third Countries in North Korea's Cyber Playbook," https://www.csis.org/analysis/hidden-enablers-third-countries-north-koreas-cyber-playbook

  9. Korea Daily, "Japan's Version of the CIA Emerges: National Intelligence Council and Bureau Officially Launched Under the PM," https://www.koreadaily.com/article/20260731003448439

  10. Center for Cybersecurity Policy, "Japan's New Active Cyber Defense Law: A Strategic Evolution in National Cybersecurity," https://www.centerforcybersecuritypolicy.org/insights-and-research/japans-new-active-cyber-defense-law-a-strategic-evolution-in-national-cybersecurity

  11. Hankuk-Japan Technology Information Center, Seoul National University, "A New Security Strategy: 'Active Cyber Defense'," https://hjtic.snu.ac.kr/node/13350

  12. Japanese Wikipedia, "SDF Cyber Defense Force (自衛隊サイバー防衛隊)," https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/自衛隊サイバー防衛隊

  13. Namuwiki, "PLA Strategic Support Force," https://namu.wiki/w/중국인민해방군%20전략지원부대

  14. Daum News, "'China Has 210 Hacking Groups, World's No. 1'... Chinese Cyberattacks Intensify Further," https://v.daum.net/v/20260203161725638

  15. Global Taiwan Institute, "China's Escalating Cyberattacks Threaten Taiwan's National Security," https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/08/chinas-cyberattacks-taiwans-national-security/

  16. Newspim, "'China-Linked Hackers Use AI to Attack Taiwan... Nuclear Regulator Also Targeted'," https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20260812001082

  17. Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, "China's daily cyberattacks on Taiwan surpassed 2.6 million in 2025, report says," https://ipdefenseforum.com/2026/01/chinas-daily-cyberattacks-on-taiwan-surpassed-2-6-million-in-2025-report-says/

  18. Asia Today, "Companies Don't Even Know They've Been Hacked… NIS Speeds Up Its 'Private-Sector Cyber Control Tower'," https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260518010004942

  19. Korea NGO News, "Civil Society Opposes NIS Act Amendment: 'Expands NIS Intelligence Activity and Covert-Action Powers'," https://www.ngonews.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=230398

  20. Dailysecu, "Will 'Suspicion' of State-Backed Hacking Alone Allow Investigation of Private Firms? NIS Act Amendment Controversy," https://www.dailysecu.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=206640

  21. Namuwiki, "National Cybersecurity Center (국가사이버안보센터)," https://namu.wiki/w/국가사이버안보센터

  22. Daum News, "The Growing Importance of 'Cyber Warfare': The Mission and Role of the Cyber Operations Command," https://v.daum.net/v/20250312060021106

  23. Asia Today, "South Korea Ranks 11th Globally in Cyber Warfare Capability… Lacks Attack-Response Experience," https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20151202010001644

  24. Korea.kr (Korean Policy Briefing), "South Korea Rated Top Tier 1 in the Global Cybersecurity Index," https://m.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148933962&pWise=mSub&pWiseSub=H13