The Second Bandung Conference and Inter-Korean Cooperation

From the retaliation over the deployment of THAAD to the dispatch of troops to the Hormuz, any Korean could not help but feel a sense of humiliation over the U.S.-China bipolar standoff, especially China's display of its own military prowess. Fortunately, Korea is not the only country to feel this way. So I imagined a second Bandung Conference. It was simply an assignment that had to be resolved if there was a problem.

 

I've been debating with AI and organizing the discussion for months, and it's fortunate that AI lacks a super-rational ability, so it cannot act in politics independently. The inability to engage in political activity also means that one cannot make judgments of good and evil. Artificial intelligence has the limitation of inevitably possessing an 'instrumental self.' So when AI causes a problem, the problem lies with the 'human' who uses it as a 'tool.'

 

Living with parents who suffered from the trauma of the Korean War, I perceived the very situation of the divided North and South Korea as humiliating. On the other hand, it is also recognized as a tool for predicting our future. I believe that a future in which North and South Korea cooperate or unify is inevitable.

After the G2: A Third Convergence,

Korea’s Chokepoints, and North Korea’s Opening

Lee Hyeong-chun · Independent Columnist

September 26, 2026

Labeling convention: (Fact) marks what has been confirmed, (Inference) marks the author’s reasoned judgment, and (Normative) marks the direction the author hopes for. Many web sources were checked only at the headline and link level (see the verification note at the end).

The US–China duopoly is likely to persist for now, but who benefits from it is not settled. If Washington is squandering the backlash effect that China’s displays of power created, the gain may flow toward a third convergence. To avoid being a mere participant in that flow, South Korea must turn its technological chokepoints into bargaining power, and on the peninsula the test case is North Korea’s opening. This column builds that argument while keeping prediction and preference apart.

1. The Duopoly Remains, but the Poles Do Not Harden into One

Given the gaps in economic, military, and technological capacity, the United States and China are likely to remain the two centers for a considerable time (Inference) [1][2][3][4]. But bipolarity is not completed by the power of two states alone; it also depends on where everyone else stands. Unlike the Cold War, there are no firm blocs today. India, Türkiye, the Gulf states, and ASEAN trade with both sides and spread their risk (Inference). The distribution of power is close to bipolar, while political behavior is close to multipolar. There is analysis suggesting that even Beijing advertises multipolarity rather than a G2 (Fact, headline-level check) [5]. A US–China summit took place in Washington on September 24 [6][7], but whether its outcome is cooperation or managed rivalry has not been verified against the full text, so I withhold judgment.

2. Who Collects the Backlash?

When China displayed power in the South China Sea, in the THAAD retaliation, and in border clashes, its neighbors closed ranks: the Quad, AUKUS, Japan’s defense expansion, and the renewed US–Philippines alignment (Fact). That closing of ranks was not built by Washington; it was supplied by Beijing’s own conduct.

The question is who receives the benefit. States alarmed by China are looking for security, and the alternative can be the United States or an autonomous space between the two powers. If Washington pressures even its allies with tariffs and cost-sharing demands, countries wary of China become wary of both (Inference). Reports describe pushback from BRICS members over US tariffs and energy trade [9], and commentary argues that the Trump–Xi summit exposes a US disadvantage in the Global South and that tariffs are redrawing the global power map [8][10] (Fact, headline-level check).

Whether this is a Trump blunder will be settled by results; if tariffs extracted real concessions, it was not a blunder. The author’s view that his line is temporary (a normative and predictive judgment) faces strong objections: he was elected twice, and the hard line on China is shared by both parties. Even if temporary, allies have already learned that America can choose such a leader, and that lesson persists as a hedging structure (Inference).

3. Convergence Works as a Possibility, Not as a Body

Whether a second Bandung will actually convene cannot be known. It took six years from the 1955 Bandung Conference to the 1961 Non-Aligned summit [11][12]. Today’s Global South is far more heterogeneous, as the India–China rivalry shows, and if anti-American solidarity looks like pro-Chinese solidarity, participation shrinks (Inference).

Even so, the author argues this: even if a third convergence is never completed, the prospect of one can act as pressure that makes both Washington and Beijing restrain themselves, since each wants to avoid losing the middle powers. On this reading, whether the convergence is completed hardly matters (Inference). The weaknesses are plain. Peaceful posture can be tactical, and the convergence can collapse from within through G2 cooperation between the two powers or through separate inducements to key states.

4. Korea: Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities

The Hormuz episode left South Korea with a sense of humiliation. But before turning a feeling into policy, the facts must be checked. In early September there were reports that Washington was waiting for a deployment [19]; on September 19, reports said Seoul conveyed its willingness to contribute at US–Korea diplomatic talks and that the United States made no deployment request (Fact, headline-level check) [17][18].

The path the author proposes for Korea is this (Normative). First, use hard-to-replace technological chokepoints, namely semiconductors, shipbuilding, and defense industry, as the source of bargaining power. But these chokepoints depend on foreign lithography equipment, design software, and materials, so they are not wholly ours, and they can become targets of great-power demands for investment and production (Inference). Second, the essence of Hormuz is the vulnerability of energy routes resting on a single strait, so energy and supply-chain diversification must proceed alongside technological strength. Korea’s diversification moves are already under discussion (Fact, headline-level check) [13][14][15][16]. Diversification, however, is not autonomy; autonomy exists only when a state has prepared alternatives and can actually refuse.

5. North Korea: The Author’s Normative Choice

This section describes the direction the author hopes for, not a forecast. Each item is presented with its objections.

5.1 US–North Korea negotiations

The United States should negotiate with North Korea so that Pyongyang need not depend on China alone (Normative). Reports that Trump has reached out and that Kim Jong Un responded positively coexist with the assessment that Kim’s snubbing is working in his favor (Fact, headline-level check) [20][21][22]. There are objections. North Korea is known to have secured another patron in Russia (Inference), and the nuclear issue and the risk of Seoul being sidelined remain. The author holds that opening matters more than sidelining, but concedes that who frames the opening determines what follows.

5.2 Nuclear weapons and conventional forces

Reduce conventional forces first and convert that strength into economic development (Normative). Because nuclear weapons are close to North Korea’s identity, a freeze with verification is unrealistic, and abolition is left as a long-term goal. The cost of this choice is not hidden: it means accepting greater security anxiety in Japan and South Korea and a weakened nonproliferation regime. Large-scale demobilization touches both the army, the regime’s core base, and unemployment, so a design that preserves the military’s interests is needed.

5.3 The red line: legalized markets, with no rollback

In exchange for a long-term guarantee of the regime’s survival, the author’s minimum demand is the legalization of the jangmadang markets and a ban on rolling it back (Normative), attached to observable indicators such as property protection, no arbitrary confiscation, and guaranteed payment. The rationale is research suggesting that markets create independent income and channels for information that weaken state control [23]. There are limits: markets and repression can coexist, as in China. North Korea is known to have suppressed markets in its 2009 currency reform (Inference), which is why the ban on rollback is the heart of the red line.

5.4 The target model and human rights

What the author hopes for is a capitalist authoritarian state like Singapore (Normative). But Singapore’s core was not authoritarianism; it was rule of law, property rights, predictable contract enforcement, and low corruption [25]. The question is whether hereditary power would bind itself to law, and a realistic path may be closer to Vietnam or China (Inference).

I do not accept that the level of human rights simply equals the level of the economy. South Korea’s rights gains were not an automatic product of growth but came through citizens’ struggle. The political prison camps are a matter the UN Commission of Inquiry judged gravely [24]. The author’s proposal takes weakened control through markets as the priority path. This is a normative choice and open to criticism. The Helsinki Final Act, which accepted the status quo while attaching human-rights and exchange provisions to induce long-term change, is a useful precedent [26].

5.5 Opening and the dissolution of division

The author hopes that opening, even if it looks like entrenching the division, will in the end dissolve it (Normative). But China and Taiwan show that deep economic exchange can coexist with lasting political division; trade does not guarantee integration. The two Koreas share a language, so Southern influence can seep in naturally, but for that very reason Pyongyang’s leadership may feel opening is more dangerous (Inference). The paths the author offers for dissolution are information inflow, generational change, and a narrowing economic gap.

6. Conditions That Would Break This Argument

• Washington adjusts its tariff and cost-sharing policy or reaches separate deals with allies, and the grievances subside.

• China resumes coercive behavior and middle powers return to the American side.

• India sharply improves or worsens ties with Washington or Beijing, removing a core member of the convergence.

• The convergence stays at the level of statements and never becomes institutional, such as payment systems or consultative bodies.

• North Korea opens but again suppresses the markets or cuts only its channels to the South.

7. Conclusion

Whether a third convergence will be completed is unknown. But the possibility alone forces restraint on both Washington and Beijing. For South Korea to be an agent that turns that possibility into reality, it needs real capacity in technological chokepoints and energy resilience, and on the peninsula it needs to set a principle around opening North Korea’s markets. Half of this column is prediction and half is preference. Readers should judge by where the line between them falls.

References

[1]  Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.

[2]  East Asia Forum (2025-12-17). US–China G2 undermines multipolarity. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/17/us-china-g2-undermines-multipolarity/

[3]  Observer Research Foundation. Return of the G2: Trump, China, and the Mirage of a Bipolar World. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/return-of-the-g2-trump-china-and-the-mirage-of-a-bipolar-world

[4]  Modern Diplomacy (2026-09-18). The Myth of a Multipolar World: Why the Global Order Is Becoming More Bipolar, Not Less. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/09/18/multipolar-world-new-bipolar-order-us-china/

[5]  China-Global South Project (2026-07-21). Why Beijing Wants Multipolarity Instead of a G2 With the U.S. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2026/07/21/china-rejects-g2-multipolar-world-global-governance/

[6]  Al Jazeera (2026-09-24). Trump-Xi summit: Four key takeaways from the Washington, DC, meeting. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/24/trump-xi-summit-four-key-takeaways-from-the-washington-dc-meeting

[7]  NBC News. Trump-Xi summit: Leaders meet at White House amid tensions over Taiwan, trade and AI. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/trump-xi-summit-meet-white-house-tensions-taiwan-trade-ai-rcna598073

[8]  Al Jazeera (2026-09-25). The Trump-Xi summit exposes a US disadvantage in the Global South. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/9/25/the-trump-xi-summit-exposes-a-us-disadvantage-in-the-global-south

[9]  WION News. BRICS Summit 2026: Trump must be watching amid pushbacks from member states on US tariffs, conflicts and energy trade. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/brics-summit-2026-trump-must-be-watching-amid-pushbacks-from-member-states-on-us-tariffs-conflicts-and-energy-trade-1788857773139

[10]  Geopolitical Monitor. Global South Can Gain as Trump Tariffs Redraw Global Power Map. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/global-south-can-gain-as-trump-tariffs-redraw-global-power-map/

[11]  Asian-African Conference (1955). Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung, 24 April 1955.

[12]  Wikipedia. 1st Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Summit_of_the_Non-Aligned_Movement

[13]  East Asia Forum (2026-06-18). South Korea's middle power diplomacy at an inflection point. https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/06/18/south-koreas-middle-power-diplomacy-at-an-inflection-point/

[14]  Asia Times (2026-04). Seoul pivots southward again, restructuring for strategic autonomy. https://asiatimes.com/2026/04/seoul-pivots-southward-again-restructuring-for-strategic-autonomy/

[15]  Observer Research Foundation. South Korea's Trade Reset: Diversifying Beyond the US and China. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-trade-reset-diversifying-beyond-the-us-and-china

[16]  Korea Economic Institute of America. How South Korea Is Trying to Increase Its Supply-Chain Resilience. https://keia.org/analysis/how-south-korea-is-trying-to-increase-its-supply-chain-resilience/

[17]  서울신문 (2026-09-19). 한미 외교회담에서 호르무즈 기여 의지 전달…“파병 요구 없어”. https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/international/2026/09/19/20260919500005

[18]  뉴스1 (2026-09-19). 韓, 미국에 호르무즈 기여 의지 전달…“美, 파병 요구 없어”(종합). https://www.news1.kr/world/usa-canada/6295959

[19]  네이트 뉴스 (2026-09-06). 美 “파병 기다린다” 이란 “침략 간주”…한국 ‘호르무즈 딜레마’. https://m.news.nate.com/view/20260906n06301

[20]  Al Jazeera (2026-08-18). ‘Very positive’: Trump says Kim Jong Un has responded to his overtures. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/18/trump-says-n-koreas-kim-has-responded-to-his-request-for-a-conversation

[21]  Washington Examiner. Kim Jong Un is ghosting Donald Trump — and it’s working. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/4706768/trump-kim-jong-un-summit-2026-nuclear-talks/

[22]  Chatham House (2026-01). North Korea in 2026: Will the US and South Korean push for talks succeed? https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/north-korea-2026-will-us-and-south-korean-push-talks-succeed

[23]  Haggard, S. & Noland, M. (2011). Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

[24]  UN Human Rights Council (2014). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A/HRC/25/63.

[25]  Lee, K. Y. (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000. HarperCollins.

[26]  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975). Final Act (Helsinki Final Act).

Source Verification Note

Web sources [2]–[10] and [12]–[22] were checked at the level of search-result headlines and links at the time of writing; the full texts were not read. They are used only to show that a debate or a report exists, and any detail or figure should be verified against the original before publication. Points that rest on background knowledge, such as North Korea’s ties with Russia and the 2009 currency reform, are marked in the text as (Inference) or “is known to have.”

제 2차 반둥회의와 남북한의 협력

사드배치에 대한 보복사건부터 호르무즈 파병까지 한국인이라면 미중 양강구도 특히 중국의 근육자랑에 대한 굴욕감을 느끼지 않을 수 없었을 것이다. 그러나 다행히도 이런 감정을 느낀 것은 한국만이 아닐 것이다. 그래서 제 2차 반둥회의를 상상해 보았다. 그냥 문제가 있으면 해결해야 하는 과제로서 말이다.

 

몇 개월째 인공지능이랑 토론하고 그 내용을 정리하고 있는데, 인공지능이 초합리적인 능력이 없기 때문에 정치행위를 독자적으로 할 수 없음은 다행이다. 정치행위를 할 수 없다는 의미는 선악의 가치판단을 할 수 없다는 의미이기도 하다. 인공지능은 ‘도구적 자아’를 가질 수밖에 없다는 한계가 있다. 그래서 인공지능이 어떤 문제를 일으키면 인공지능을 ‘도구’로 사용하는 ‘인간’이 문제다.

 

나는 한국전쟁의 트라우마를 앓고 있는 부모옆에서 분단되어 있는 남북한의 처지 자체를 굴욕적으로 인식하고 있었다. 한 편으로는 우리들의 미래를 예측하는 도구로서도 인식하고 있다. 나는 남북한이 협력하거나 통일될 미래는 피할 수 없는 미래라는 인식을 하고 있다.

양강 이후: 제3의 결집, 한국의 병목,

그리고 북한의 개방

이형춘 · 독립 칼럼니스트

2026년 9월 26일

표기 원칙: 본문의 (사실)은 확인된 내용, (추론)은 저자의 논리적 판단, (규범)은 저자가 바라는 방향이다. 웹 자료 다수는 제목과 링크 수준으로만 확인했다(끝의 검증 메모 참조).

미국과 중국의 양강 구도는 당분간 유지된다. 그러나 그 구도의 수혜자는 정해져 있지 않다. 중국의 힘 과시가 만든 반사효과를 미국이 걷어차고 있다면, 그 이익은 제3의 결집으로 흐를 수 있다. 한국은 그 흐름의 참여자에 머물지 않기 위해 기술 병목을 협상력으로 삼아야 하며, 한반도에서는 북한의 개방이 그 시험대다. 이 글은 예측과 바람을 구분하여 그 논리를 세운다.

1. 양강은 남지만, 극은 하나로 굳지 않는다

경제, 군사, 기술의 격차를 보면 미국과 중국이 앞으로 상당 기간 두 개의 중심으로 남을 가능성이 높다(추론) [1][2][3][4]. 그러나 양극은 두 나라의 힘만으로 완성되지 않는다. 나머지 국가들이 어느 편에 서느냐가 함께 결정한다. 냉전과 달리 지금은 확고한 블록이 없다. 인도, 튀르키예, 걸프국, 아세안은 양쪽과 동시에 거래하며 위험을 분산한다(추론). 힘의 분포는 양극에 가깝고 정치적 행태는 다극에 가깝다는 뜻이다. 중국조차 G2가 아니라 다극 체제를 내세운다는 분석이 있다(사실, 제목 수준 확인) [5]. 9월 24일 워싱턴에서 미중 정상회담이 열렸으나 [6][7], 그 결과가 협조인지 관리된 경쟁인지는 본문 검증 전이므로 판단을 유보한다.

2. 반사효과는 누구의 몫인가

중국이 남중국해, 사드 보복, 국경 충돌에서 힘을 과시하자 주변국은 결속했다. 쿼드, 오커스, 일본의 방위 확대, 필리핀과 미국의 재밀착이 그 사례다(사실). 이 결속은 미국이 만든 것이 아니라 중국의 행동이 제공한 것이었다.

문제는 그 반사효과를 누가 받아 가느냐다. 놀란 나라들이 찾는 것은 안전이고, 그 대안은 미국일 수도 있고 미중 사이의 자율 공간일 수도 있다. 미국이 동맹국에게까지 관세와 분담금으로 압박하면 중국을 경계하던 나라들은 양쪽을 경계하게 된다(추론). 실제로 BRICS 회의에서 미국의 관세와 에너지 무역을 둘러싼 회원국의 반발이 보도되고 [9], 미중 정상회담이 글로벌 사우스에서 미국의 불리함을 드러낸다는 논평과 관세가 세계 권력 지형을 다시 그린다는 분석이 나온다 [8][10](사실, 제목 수준 확인).

이것이 트럼프의 실책인지는 결과가 판가름한다. 관세로 양보를 얻어냈다면 실책이 아니다. 또한 그의 노선이 일시적이라는 것이 저자의 판단이지만(규범적이자 예측적 판단), 반론은 강하다. 그는 두 번 당선되었고, 대중국 강경 노선은 양당이 공유한다. 설령 일시적이라 해도 동맹국은 미국이 이런 지도자를 선택할 수 있음을 이미 학습했고, 그 학습은 헤징 구조로 남는다(추론).

3. 결집은 실체가 아니라 가능성으로 작동한다

제2의 반둥이 실제로 열릴지는 알 수 없다. 1955년 반둥회의에서 1961년 비동맹운동 정상회의까지 6년이 걸렸다 [11][12]. 오늘의 글로벌 사우스는 인도와 중국의 경쟁 관계처럼 훨씬 이질적이다. 반미 연대가 곧 친중 연대로 보이면 참여국은 줄어든다(추론).

그럼에도 저자는 이렇게 주장한다. 제3의 결집이 완성되지 않아도, 그럴 수 있다는 전망이 미국과 중국을 절제하게 만드는 압력으로 작동할 수 있다. 두 강대국은 중견국을 잃지 않으려고 태도를 누그러뜨린다. 이 경우 결집의 완성 여부는 중요하지 않다(추론). 이 논리의 약점도 분명하다. 평화적 태도는 전술일 수 있고, 두 강대국이 중견국을 나누어 갖는 G2 협조나 핵심 국가의 개별 회유로 결집이 내부에서 무너질 수 있다.

4. 한국: 병목과 취약성

호르무즈 사태는 한국에게 굴욕감을 남겼다. 그러나 감정을 정책의 동력으로 삼기 전에 실체를 확인해야 한다. 9월 초에는 미국이 파병을 기다린다는 보도가 있었으나 [19], 9월 19일 한미 외교회담에서 한국이 기여 의지를 전했고 미국의 파병 요구는 없었다고 보도되었다(사실, 제목 수준 확인) [17][18].

저자가 한국에 제시하는 길은 이렇다(규범). 첫째, 대체하기 어려운 기술 병목, 즉 반도체, 조선, 방위산업을 협상력의 원천으로 삼는다. 그러나 이 병목은 노광장비, 설계 소프트웨어, 소재를 외국에 의존하므로 온전히 우리 것이 아니고, 강대국이 투자와 생산을 요구하는 표적이 되기도 한다(추론). 둘째, 호르무즈의 본질은 에너지 수송로가 한 해협에 걸려 있다는 취약성이므로, 기술 우위와 별개로 에너지와 공급망의 다변화를 병행해야 한다. 한국의 다변화 움직임은 이미 논의되고 있다(사실, 제목 수준 확인) [13][14][15][16]. 다만 다변화가 곧 자율성은 아니다. 자율성은 대안을 마련해 두고 실제로 거절할 수 있을 때 성립한다.

5. 북한: 저자의 규범적 선택

이 절은 예측이 아니라 저자가 바라는 방향이다. 각 항목은 반론과 함께 제시한다.

5.1 미국과 북한의 협상

미국이 북한과 협상하여, 북한이 중국 일변도로 의존하지 않아도 되는 여건을 만들어야 한다(규범). 트럼프가 대화를 시도하고 김정은이 긍정적으로 응답했다는 보도와, 김정은이 이를 무시하는 방식이 효과를 내고 있다는 평가가 엇갈린다(사실, 제목 수준 확인) [20][21][22]. 반론도 있다. 북한은 러시아라는 다른 의존처를 이미 확보한 것으로 알려져 있고(추론), 핵 문제와 한국 배제(코리아 패싱)의 위험이 남는다. 저자는 개방의 중요성이 코리아 패싱보다 크다고 보지만, 개방의 틀을 누가 짜느냐가 이후의 방향을 정한다는 점은 인정한다.

5.2 핵과 재래식 군사력

재래식 군사력의 감축을 먼저 하고 그 힘을 경제 개발로 전환한다(규범). 핵은 북한의 정체성에 가까우므로 동결과 검증은 현실성이 낮고, 폐기는 장기 목표로 둔다. 이 선택의 대가를 숨기지 않는다. 일본과 한국의 안보 불안, 비확산 체제의 약화를 감수한다는 뜻이다. 군의 대규모 감축은 군부라는 체제의 핵심 기반과 실업 문제를 동시에 건드리므로, 군의 이익을 보전하는 설계가 필요하다.

5.3 요구선: 장마당의 합법화와 되돌림 금지

정권의 존립을 장기간 보장하는 대가로 저자가 요구하는 최소선은 장마당의 합법화와 그 되돌림의 금지다(규범). 재산권 보호, 임의 몰수 금지, 대금 지급 보장 같은 관찰 가능한 지표를 붙인다. 근거는 시장이 주민의 독자적 소득원과 정보 유입 통로를 만들어 국가의 통제를 약화시킨다는 연구다 [23]. 한계도 있다. 시장과 억압은 공존할 수 있다(중국의 사례). 북한은 2009년 화폐개혁으로 시장을 억누른 적이 있는 것으로 알려져 있으므로(추론), 되돌림 금지가 요구선의 핵심이다.

5.4 목표 모델과 인권

저자가 바라는 것은 싱가포르와 같은 자본주의 독재국가다(규범). 그러나 싱가포르의 핵심은 독재가 아니라 법치, 재산권, 계약의 예측 가능성, 낮은 부패였다 [25]. 세습 권력이 스스로를 법에 묶을 것인지가 관건이며, 현실적 경로는 베트남이나 중국에 더 가까울 수 있다(추론).

인권 수준이 경제 수준과 같다는 주장에는 동의하지 않는다. 한국의 인권 개선은 경제성장의 자동적 결과가 아니라 시민의 투쟁을 거친 것이었다. 정치범 수용소 문제는 유엔 조사위원회가 심각하게 지적한 사안이다 [24]. 저자의 구상은 시장을 통한 통제 약화를 우선 경로로 삼는다. 이는 규범적 선택이며 비판받을 수 있다. 체제의 현상 유지를 인정하면서 인권과 교류 조항을 함께 넣어 장기적 변화를 유도한 헬싱키 협정이 참고할 만한 선례다 [26].

5.5 개방과 분단의 해체

저자는 개방이 분단의 고착으로 보이더라도 결국 분단을 해체시키리라 바란다(규범). 그러나 중국과 대만은 깊은 경제 교류에도 정치적 분단이 이어지고 있다. 교역은 통합을 보장하지 않는다. 남북은 같은 언어를 쓰므로 남한의 영향이 자연스럽게 스며들 수 있지만, 바로 그 때문에 북한 지도부는 개방을 더 위험하게 느낄 수 있다(추론). 저자가 제시하는 해체의 경로는 정보 유입, 세대교체, 경제 격차의 축소다.

6. 이 논지를 무너뜨릴 조건

• 미국이 관세와 분담금 정책을 조정하거나 동맹국과 개별 합의에 도달해 불만이 가라앉는 경우

• 중국이 다시 강압적 행동을 보여 중견국이 미국 쪽으로 되돌아오는 경우

• 인도가 미국 또는 중국과 관계를 크게 개선하거나 악화시켜 결집의 핵심이 빠지는 경우

• 결집이 성명 수준에 머물고 결제망이나 협의 기구 같은 실질적 제도화로 이어지지 않는 경우

• 북한이 개방하더라도 시장을 다시 억누르거나 남한과의 경로만 차단하는 경우

7. 맺으며

제3의 결집이 완성될지는 모른다. 그러나 가능성만으로도 미국과 중국은 절제를 강요받는다. 한국은 그 가능성을 현실로 만드는 참여자가 되려면 기술 병목과 에너지 자립이라는 실력을 갖추어야 하고, 한반도에서는 북한의 시장을 여는 데서 원칙을 세워야 한다. 이 글의 절반은 예측이고 절반은 바람이다. 독자는 그 경계를 보고 판단하기 바란다.

참고문헌

[1]  Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.

[2]  East Asia Forum (2025-12-17). US–China G2 undermines multipolarity. https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/12/17/us-china-g2-undermines-multipolarity/

[3]  Observer Research Foundation. Return of the G2: Trump, China, and the Mirage of a Bipolar World. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/return-of-the-g2-trump-china-and-the-mirage-of-a-bipolar-world

[4]  Modern Diplomacy (2026-09-18). The Myth of a Multipolar World: Why the Global Order Is Becoming More Bipolar, Not Less. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/09/18/multipolar-world-new-bipolar-order-us-china/

[5]  China-Global South Project (2026-07-21). Why Beijing Wants Multipolarity Instead of a G2 With the U.S. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2026/07/21/china-rejects-g2-multipolar-world-global-governance/

[6]  Al Jazeera (2026-09-24). Trump-Xi summit: Four key takeaways from the Washington, DC, meeting. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/24/trump-xi-summit-four-key-takeaways-from-the-washington-dc-meeting

[7]  NBC News. Trump-Xi summit: Leaders meet at White House amid tensions over Taiwan, trade and AI. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/trump-xi-summit-meet-white-house-tensions-taiwan-trade-ai-rcna598073

[8]  Al Jazeera (2026-09-25). The Trump-Xi summit exposes a US disadvantage in the Global South. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/9/25/the-trump-xi-summit-exposes-a-us-disadvantage-in-the-global-south

[9]  WION News. BRICS Summit 2026: Trump must be watching amid pushbacks from member states on US tariffs, conflicts and energy trade. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/brics-summit-2026-trump-must-be-watching-amid-pushbacks-from-member-states-on-us-tariffs-conflicts-and-energy-trade-1788857773139

[10]  Geopolitical Monitor. Global South Can Gain as Trump Tariffs Redraw Global Power Map. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/global-south-can-gain-as-trump-tariffs-redraw-global-power-map/

[11]  Asian-African Conference (1955). Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung, 24 April 1955.

[12]  Wikipedia. 1st Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Summit_of_the_Non-Aligned_Movement

[13]  East Asia Forum (2026-06-18). South Korea's middle power diplomacy at an inflection point. https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/06/18/south-koreas-middle-power-diplomacy-at-an-inflection-point/

[14]  Asia Times (2026-04). Seoul pivots southward again, restructuring for strategic autonomy. https://asiatimes.com/2026/04/seoul-pivots-southward-again-restructuring-for-strategic-autonomy/

[15]  Observer Research Foundation. South Korea's Trade Reset: Diversifying Beyond the US and China. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-trade-reset-diversifying-beyond-the-us-and-china

[16]  Korea Economic Institute of America. How South Korea Is Trying to Increase Its Supply-Chain Resilience. https://keia.org/analysis/how-south-korea-is-trying-to-increase-its-supply-chain-resilience/

[17]  서울신문 (2026-09-19). 한미 외교회담에서 호르무즈 기여 의지 전달…“파병 요구 없어”. https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/international/2026/09/19/20260919500005

[18]  뉴스1 (2026-09-19). 韓, 미국에 호르무즈 기여 의지 전달…“美, 파병 요구 없어”(종합). https://www.news1.kr/world/usa-canada/6295959

[19]  네이트 뉴스 (2026-09-06). 美 “파병 기다린다” 이란 “침략 간주”…한국 ‘호르무즈 딜레마’. https://m.news.nate.com/view/20260906n06301

[20]  Al Jazeera (2026-08-18). ‘Very positive’: Trump says Kim Jong Un has responded to his overtures. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/18/trump-says-n-koreas-kim-has-responded-to-his-request-for-a-conversation

[21]  Washington Examiner. Kim Jong Un is ghosting Donald Trump — and it’s working. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/4706768/trump-kim-jong-un-summit-2026-nuclear-talks/

[22]  Chatham House (2026-01). North Korea in 2026: Will the US and South Korean push for talks succeed? https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/north-korea-2026-will-us-and-south-korean-push-talks-succeed

[23]  Haggard, S. & Noland, M. (2011). Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Peterson Institute for International Economics.

[24]  UN Human Rights Council (2014). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A/HRC/25/63.

[25]  Lee, K. Y. (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000. HarperCollins.

[26]  Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975). Final Act (Helsinki Final Act).

출처 검증 메모

이 글이 인용한 웹 자료 [2]–[10], [12]–[22]는 작성 시점에 검색 결과의 제목과 링크 수준에서만 확인했고 본문 전체를 정독하지 못했다. 따라서 해당 자료는 논쟁의 존재와 보도 사실을 뒷받침하는 용도로만 썼으며, 세부 수치와 주장은 게재 전 원문 확인이 필요하다. 북한과 러시아의 관계, 2009년 화폐개혁 등 기존 지식에 기댄 대목은 본문에 (추론) 또는 “알려져 있다”로 표시했다.

For Romance

The wound of feeling the enormous barrier to an ideal democratic society after the declaration of martial law lasted for a very long time. This is likely because many people still exist as accomplices to potential acts of martial law. On the other hand, I recently witnessed a shocking incident regarding the bus system in a new town I had briefly visited. I was shocked by the atmosphere of the new city,

where the noble goals of bus drivers’ and passengers’ safety and respect for human beings had vanished, and vehicles over 10 tons were being recklessly pushed around solely for mechanical efficiency. On the other hand, I found myself missing the days of driving buses in the old downtown area.

 

I spent much of my formative years in the countryside and spent a lot of time with the school choir, and during my period of hardship, those memories became a great source of strength. Lately, I often went back to the school I attended to gather my thoughts. And I found myself wanting to take up singing or playing an instrument as a hobby again.

 

I felt that talking to AI about such issues was truly foolish. I say we should live with humanity, but the AI keeps pointing out what is wrong with my argument. I felt bad, but I ended up wrapping up the discussion. We began the discussion with the proposition that humans can be evil if they lose their emotions, and then I realized that Hitler was a painter, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il liked the song “Boarder.” And the people of the Middle East, whose homes are barren deserts with insufficient food, clothing, and shelter, are still fighting hard today. The same goes for Russia. Through the folk song [crane], while comforting the souls of the countless young people who have disappeared from the battlefield, Russia continues to drive young people away from it even today.

The Erosion of Sensibility and

Education for Humanity

Discussion Notes (working title)

Lee Hyeong-chun · Independent Columnist   |   September 22, 2026

Key: [Established] widely accepted to the best of the author’s knowledge; [Inference] argued claim; [Experience] the author’s own observation or experience. These notes summarize a discussion; they are not a finished column.

1. The Starting Question: Would Humans Without Emotion Turn Evil?

A human being stripped of emotion would not so much turn evil as lose the very motive that separates good from evil. Patients whose emotional signals were cut off by prefrontal damage kept their intelligence yet could not make even trivial decisions (Damasio). [Established] Psychopaths, too, are not devoid of emotion; particular affects such as fear, empathy, and guilt are weak, and most are not violent offenders. [Established]

Conversely, the raw material of large-scale evil in history has usually been emotion: hatred, fear, resentment, and passion for the in-group. What Arendt saw in Eichmann was not an excess of feeling but a lack of thought. [Established] Evil can be sorted into three types: active malice that seeks to inflict pain, instrumental indifference to others’ suffering, and evil committed out of a conviction of one’s own righteousness. The real danger lies not in the presence or absence of emotion but in the selective operation of empathy. Empathy that runs in excess toward our side and switches off toward the other side produces large-scale evil. [Inference]

2. Cases of Power-Holders and the “Occupational Worldview” Hypothesis

We examined the hypothesis that a long professional career desensitized two leaders to war and the manufacture of crises: one leader from an intelligence-service background and one former leader from a prosecutorial background. Diagnosing such a career as “mental collapse” has no basis and risks lowering accountability. According to press reports, the former prosecutor-turned-leader received a first-instance guilty finding to the effect that he induced a hostile power’s provocation in order to manufacture a pretext for justifying his hold on power (whether the appeal has concluded or the verdict is final could not be confirmed). That logic looks like instrumental calculation toward an end, not psychic breakdown. The other leader’s strong narrative of grievance and humiliation likewise does not describe a person without emotion. [Inference]

As an alternative we proposed an “occupational worldview” hypothesis. Intelligence services and prosecution offices are closed, hierarchical organizations that presuppose the other party as a potential enemy and institutionalize suspicion, so long service instills a habit of dividing the world into enemies and allies. The hypothesis faces selection bias (most people with the same career never start wars) and counterexamples (belligerent leaders without such careers). To keep a genuinely third-party view, the same standard must be applied to leaders with other backgrounds, not just these two, and falsification conditions must be stated in advance. [Inference]

The causes of numbing are not singular. They combine habituation by the job (Bandura’s moral disengagement), selection of already-numbed people into such jobs, the power effect that reduces empathy (Keltner; Owen), conformity to one’s surroundings, and chronic pressure. These can be gathered under a single phenomenon, the social erosion of sensibility, with each factor arranged as a pathway of erosion. Remedies differ by cause, however: job rotation, screening, or checks on power. [Inference]

3. Environment and Social Symptoms: Contact Structure and Willingness to Intervene

As a bus driver, the author long observed passengers on old-downtown routes and new-town routes in Seoul. Old-downtown passengers were warm and complained a lot, showing rich emotional expression, while new-town passengers appeared terse, plain, and arid. Comparing young people of the same age, old-downtown youth protested against someone behaving unjustly, whereas new-town youth quietly slipped away, and the old-downtown protests looked like acts on behalf of justice. [Experience]

This observation needs careful handling. What was observed was not sensibility itself but emotional expressiveness and intervening behavior. Confounders remain: age composition, income, length of residence, anonymity, and the exam pressure of new towns. Avoidance may be a rational calculation in an anonymous society where retaliation is a risk, and old-downtown warmth may be face-saving before people who know one another. Observer confirmation bias cannot be excluded either. Since all of the author’s cases point one way, counterexamples should be sought and disclosed. [Inference]

Even so, the observation connects to established concepts. Research shows that neighborhoods with strong social cohesion and a shared expectation of stepping in for the common order, that is, high collective efficacy, have less violence (Sampson et al.), and bystander research reports that intervention declines as crowds grow larger and more anonymous (Darley and Latané). [Established] Simmel held that the overstimulation of metropolitan life breeds reserve and an intellectualized attitude. That differences appear even within the same city suggests the cause lies not in city size but in the density of relationships and the structure of chance contact. The claim that grid roads or concrete themselves dry people out is therefore weak, and it is better defended when recast as how space designs contact. On the other hand, the culture of jeong (affection) has its shadow in territoriality, meddling, and conformity pressure, and anonymity has its own value in freedom and privacy. Warmth is not moral superiority; what matters is the range over which it extends. [Inference]

4. A Provisional Definition of Humanity

We tentatively define humanity in three layers: sensibility that responds to others’ suffering, the will to step in against injustice, and the extension of empathy beyond the in-group. This is a provisional draft that the author must settle. The author must also state whether humanity is something innate that must be preserved (a Mencian premise) or something made through education (Xunzi). Because raising sensibility alone may strengthen in-group bias (Bloom), widening its range is also required. [Inference]

5. The Remedy: An Inner Home and Autonomy-Protected Arts and Sports

The author testifies that childhood in the countryside and time in a school choir later became, in hard times, an “inner home,” a resource for recovery. [Experience] This is not a claim that art makes people moral; it is a claim that such experiences form a reserve that helps a person stay human under pressure. It resonates with research showing that contact with nature aids recovery from stress (Ulrich; Kaplan). [Established] Yet in this experience countryside and choir came together, so the source of the effect cannot be isolated, and recollection tends toward idealization. [Inference]

Evidence that art makes people good is mixed. Steiner pointed out that a cultured society failed to prevent barbarism; a well-known study claiming that literary fiction improves understanding of others’ minds has faced replication disputes (Kidd and Castano; Panero et al.); and positive studies exist showing that museum visits or ensemble music-making raised tolerance and empathy (Greene et al.; Rabinowitch et al.). [Established: evidence is mixed] The arts and sports are also used for mobilization. Mass gymnastics and state sport systems whose purposes and content are set by the state are mobilizational, while the Baltic Singing Revolution and Czech rock bands served resistance. The same form has served both control and resistance. The safety-valve function, in which discontent is relieved and the regime preserved, may also work by draining the will to intervene. [Inference]

The criterion is therefore not whether something is instrumental, but who sets its purpose and content and to whom its results accrue. Rice-planting work songs had a plain instrumental aim of raising efficiency, yet the workers chose and altered the songs themselves, the outcome belonged to the community, and satire and complaint were sung into them. By contrast, arts and sports whose purposes and content are set by the state, the market, or entrance exams lose autonomy. The agent of mobilization is not only the state but also the market (trainee systems, exam-driven arts education). The decisive variable is not capitalism versus socialism but freedom of expression and participants’ autonomy. Banned songs under the Yushin era and the culture-sector blacklist show that creation can be blocked even under a capitalist economy. [Inference]

In sum, the remedy is not simply more arts and sports but more autonomy-protected arts and sports, not separated from life. It may be a problem in itself that modern schooling detaches the arts and sports into subjects to be graded and ranked. There should be some measure of life lived together with nature, and where that is hard, humanity should at least be cultivable through art. This position stands on the tradition in which Plato made music and gymnastics the two pillars of education, the Confucian and Xunzian tradition of ritual and music, and Schiller’s aesthetic education, and it must also accept the warning that these traditions were used for censorship and the maintenance of hierarchy. [Inference]

6. Outlook: Humanity in the Age of AI

A conditional forecast is possible: if AI replaces cognitive labor, the relative value of humanity may well rise. A flat assertion that “such an era is coming” is harder to make. In chess, the value of humans competing in person persisted after machines pulled ahead. However, humanity becoming important is not the same as the market rewarding it (care work is undervalued). Moreover, because AI can simulate empathy (a study in which chatbot answers were rated more empathetic than physicians’), human uniqueness should be sought in authenticity and accountability rather than in the function of empathy, and passive consumption of personalized content could even reduce contact. [Inference]

Accordingly, the “condition” layer, the claim that the sensibility of those who supervise and bear responsibility is a condition of society’s survival, should be advanced strongly on normative grounds, while the “reward” layer should be recast from a prediction into an institutional demand: society must reward the work of cultivating and protecting humanity (education, care, artistic activity). The purpose of the arts and sports must be humanity, not competitiveness. The fuller treatment of AI is left for a follow-up column. [Inference]

7. Open Tasks

1. A concrete assessment design that keeps the arts and sports from being absorbed back into entrance exams (for example, non-evaluated subjects detached from grades and ranking).

2. What could serve in cities the function of work songs, that is, a shared art not separated from life.

3. Settling the definition of humanity and choosing between the Mencian and Xunzian premises.

4. How to handle the fact that evidence for arts and sports raising sensibility is mixed.

5. Falsification conditions for the occupational-worldview hypothesis and its equal application to leaders of other backgrounds.

6. Disclosing confounders in the bus-observation cases and searching for counterexamples.

References

The bibliographic details were compiled from the AI assistant’s (Claude’s) knowledge during the discussion; please verify them against the originals before publication or citation. June 2026 press reports on the first-instance ruling are omitted because their headlines contain personal names.

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