I had extensive discussions with AI about the deployment of the South Korean military to the Strait of Hormuz, and the summary was simple. Because making decisions based on principles would yield neither benefit nor harm. And above all, because it is the right thing to do.
Because North Korea is participating in the war in Ukraine under Russian influence, I became very emotional about the issue of deploying South Korean troops. Claiming to understand me, the AI systematically refuted my logic.
Sometimes I know what is right and wrong because I am human, and I get angry about it, but since AI doesn't have that, I tell AI that you are inferior to me.But as the world seems to acknowledge, I feel that artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly intelligent. On the other hand, I also feel that a Korean-style artificial intelligence is needed. I think I sensed a uniquely human feeling that there might be something I shouldn't say to the American AI.
At Hormuz, Korea Must Defend a Principle,
Not Answer a Demand
Passage without permission as the measure of normalcy, and an independent decision to deploy
Lee Hyeong-chun · Independent Columnist | September 20, 2026
1. Two Forms of Subordination
“We will remember.” In March, President Trump warned countries that did not help secure the Strait of Hormuz in exactly these words.[1] On September 4, a senior U.S. administration official said Washington was “still waiting” for Seoul to deploy resources to the region.[2] On September 18, President Lee Jae Myung drew his line: there will be no dispatch of troops that leads to involvement in a conflict.[3] For six months Korea has behaved as though there were only two possible answers: comply with the demand, or refuse because of the demand.
I regard both as subordination. That a deployment made in surrender to a demand is subordination hardly needs saying. But refusing merely because Mr. Trump wants it is subordination too. The moment another party’s intention becomes the variable in one’s decision, the reference point sits in Washington, whether the answer is yes or no. I apply this yardstick to every party equally. Whether it is Mr. Trump’s pressure, Iran’s blockade or Israel’s calculations, I ask one question: does the act break what is normal?
When the war began, I felt that America had thrown a stone into a world that had been running peacefully, and that Israel had made it throw. That was my impression at the time, not an established fact. Nor can the period before the war be called perfectly peaceful. But whoever threw the first stone, my starting point is clear: the ripples must not be allowed to wash over Korea.
2. Normalcy Means Passage Without Permission
The freedom of the seas is one of the oldest natural-law traditions of modern international law. In 1609 Hugo Grotius argued in Mare Liberum that the sea belongs to no one and is open to the passage of all nations.[4] That tradition is codified today in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the freedom of the high seas (Article 87) and the right of transit passage through international straits (Articles 38 and 44).[5]
One precision is needed. Hormuz is not high seas; it is a strait where the territorial waters of coastal states overlap. What applies is therefore not the freedom of the high seas but the regime of transit passage, under which coastal states may not hamper or suspend transit.[5] Iran signed UNCLOS but never ratified it, and has stated that it would apply the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention to non-parties.[7] Korea is a party, having joined in 1996.[5,6] In this dispute I stand neither with Iran nor with the United States, but with the norm. Normalcy is not passage granted by Iran’s permission; it is passage that needs no permission.
3. Yet Korea Is Already Asking for Permission
Reality departs from the principle. After the war began in late February, 26 Korean vessels were held up at Hormuz.[10] On April 4, a government investigation confirmed that the container ship HMM Namu had been struck by an unidentified projectile.[8] In May, a Korean tanker first left the strait after consultations with Iran, following the route Iran specified; Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Seoul would maintain its basic position that all vessels must enjoy freedom of passage.[9] By June 26, 21 of the 26 ships had returned and five remained.[10] On August 31, a tanker operated by Sinokor was hit near Oman’s coast; no Korean crew were aboard.[11] Tanker attacks have continued into September.[13]
Saving sailors and cargo comes first, so these consultations were a defensible, practical choice. But if transit by Iranian permission along Iranian-designated routes hardens into practice, a permit regime becomes precedent. According to some reports, Iran demands that both lanes lie within its territorial waters and is pursuing a hefty per-vessel “service fee.”[12] That report rests on a single outlet and needs confirmation, but if true the problem does not end at Hormuz. A nation that lives on seaborne imports and exports cannot afford to see permit regimes spread to other straits.
4. Designing a Deployment That Fits the Principle
If principle is the ground of the decision, the deployment must fit the principle. The moment force is wielded in the name of a principle, the principle undermines itself. A right of passage is not a license for enforcement. In the 1949 Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice recognized the right of passage of British warships, yet held that Britain’s later unilateral mine-clearing operation in Albanian waters violated Albania’s sovereignty.[14] I propose the following conditions.
Mission: limited to defensive tasks such as escorting merchant ships.
Command: exclusively Korean, and not folded into any U.S.-led coalition operation.
Procedure: National Assembly consent under Article 60(2) of the Constitution.
Notice and consent: prior notification to Iran, and the consent of coastal states bordering the strait, such as Oman.
Conditions for not deploying or withdrawing: no deployment if it would not materially help restore free passage or would raise the risk to Korean ships; withdrawal once the conditions are resolved.
This design also interlocks with the Constitution. Article 5(1) renounces aggressive war.[15] The mission avoids conflict with that clause only so long as it remains defensive. And in the 2004 constitutional complaints over the Iraq deployment, the Constitutional Court dismissed them, treating a dispatch decision as outside judicial review.[16] If the courts will not act as a check, responsibility for judgment returns to the National Assembly and the public. That is why the consent procedure matters all the more.
5. Three Objections
The first is free-riding: benefiting from routes secured by the United States and others while refusing to pay one’s share. A principled deployment, in which Korea decides and bears its own share, is the answer to that charge.
The second is selective application. This principle is not valid only at Hormuz. Korea must be able to say the same thing about the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The principle is not a promise to send warships to every strait; it is a promise to say the same thing about every strait. The yardstick applies to China as well. In 2016 the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea case found no basis for China to claim historic rights, beyond what UNCLOS allows, within the waters of the nine-dash line; China neither took part in the proceedings nor accepted the result.[18] Restricting passage, and forcing another state’s decision through economic pressure, must be judged by the same measure whether the actor is the United States or China. China’s economic retaliation against Korea over the 2017 THAAD deployment, which hit tourism, automobiles and retail, is the precedent,[19] and saying this may carry a price. I believe Korea can turn that experience into an asset for its independent standing, but that is my inference. If Korea lacks the resolve to accept that price, it should not call this a principle.
The third is the surrender of a price. Korea forgoes the concessions it might extract by using the U.S. demand as leverage. I choose legitimacy over that price knowingly. To declare openly that one chose principle when principle and profit collided is itself the way to keep a principle.
6. Waiting Is Not a Strategy
Some urge Korea to wait out the Trump administration. But when President Johnson gave up his bid for re-election in 1968, the Vietnam War went on until 1973, and in 1971 the Nixon administration withdrew the U.S. 7th Infantry Division from Korea, as the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine demanded that allies bear a larger share of their own defense.[17] A change of leader did not remove the alliance’s bill; it could deepen it. My inference is that burden-sharing demands on allies may be a structural trend rather than one leader’s mood. Meanwhile the cost of waiting is paid by Korea. Mr. Trump’s term runs until January 2029.
7. A Decision That Narrows What Others Can Say
I do not believe an independent decision grounded in principle silences every critic. Iran will still assert its own terms; the United States may still claim that Korea answered its call; opposition will remain at home. But such a decision gives a clear answer in three directions. To the United States: this is not surrender but a decision made by criteria Korea itself announced. To Iran: what Korea contests is not Iran as a state but the practice of permit regimes. To Koreans: the criteria and conditions are public. It would be the decision least vulnerable to the charge of double standards.
What Korea must defend is not a new interest but the original normal. To define that normal neither by Iran’s permission nor by America’s demand is the most sovereign choice Korea can make at Hormuz.
Author’s note (fact versus inference): The passages on Israel’s role and on the pre-war world, the view that allied burden-sharing demands are a structural trend, and the expectation that the THAAD retaliation experience can strengthen Korea’s independent standing, are my impressions or inferences. The Iranian fee claims rest on a single outlet and are unconfirmed. Reference [1] is based on the headline because the article text could not be accessed. Details of UNCLOS, the Corfu Channel judgment and the constitutional provisions should be checked against primary texts before citation.
References
[1] CNBC, “‘We will remember’: Trump warns countries to help secure Strait of Hormuz as shipping stalls,” March 16, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/16/trump-demands-allies-secure-strait-of-hormuz-oil-iran.html
[2] Weekly Kyunghyang, “미 ‘한국 호르무즈 파병 여전히 기다리는중’…결단 압박” [U.S.: ‘Still waiting for Korea’s Hormuz deployment’] (in Korean), September 5, 2026. https://weekly.khan.co.kr/article/202609051031001/
[3] Al Jazeera, “South Korea says US-North Korea talks possible, rules out Hormuz deployment,” September 18, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/18/south-korea-says-us-north-korea-talks-possible-rules-out-hormuz-deployment
[4] Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum (1609).
[5] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Articles 38, 44 and 87. Korean and English text: https://www.korea.kr/archive/expDocView.do?docId=28380
[6] Hankook Ilbo, “유엔해양법 내달 발효” [UN Law of the Sea Convention to enter into force next month] (in Korean), January 31, 1996. https://www.hankookilbo.com/news/article/199601310069668602
[7] Nilufer Oral, “Transit Passage Rights in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the Passage of Oil Tankers,” ASIL Insights 16(16), 2012. https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage
[8] Digital Times, “발묶인 한국 배 26척 언제까지…” [How long will 26 stranded Korean ships wait…] (in Korean), 2026. https://www.dt.co.kr/article/12061937
[9] Newdaily, “호르무즈 갇힌 韓 유조선 첫 통항 개시…” [First passage begins for Korean tanker held at Hormuz…] (in Korean), May 20, 2026. https://biz.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2026/05/20/2026052000217.html
[10] Seoul Shinmun, “‘5척 남았다’ 한국 선박 8척 호르무즈 해협 추가 통과” [‘Five remain’: eight more Korean ships pass Hormuz] (in Korean), June 26, 2026. https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/economy/2026/06/26/20260626500053
[11] Seoul Shinmun, “충돌 거세진 호르무즈… 韓 장금상선 유조선 피격” [Hormuz clashes intensify: Sinokor tanker hit] (in Korean), September 3, 2026. https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/international/2026/09/03/20260903012007
[12] Tech Times, “Iran Demands Control Over Both Strait of Hormuz Lanes, Rejects Oman’s Voluntary-Fee Plan,” July 28, 2026. (Single-outlet report; unconfirmed.) https://www.techtimes.com/articles/321913/20260728/iran-demands-control-over-both-strait-hormuz-lanes-rejects-omans-voluntary-fee-plan.htm
[13] Council on Foreign Relations, “Conflict With Iran,” Global Conflict Tracker (as of September 2026). https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran
[14] International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment (Merits), 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/1
[15] Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Articles 5(1) and 60(2).
[16] Constitutional Court of Korea, Case 2003Hun-Ma255·256 (consolidated) (dismissal of constitutional complaints on the Iraq deployment); Hankook Ilbo, “이라크 파병은 통치행위 사법적 판단대상 안된다” [Iraq deployment is an act of state, not subject to judicial review] (in Korean), April 30, 2004. https://www.hankookilbo.com/news/article/200404300041765781
[17] CSIS, “The Meaning of U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/meaning-us-troop-withdrawals-korea
[18] Permanent Court of Arbitration, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award of 12 July 2016. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf
[19] Troy Stangarone, “South Korean Losses from China’s THAAD Retaliation Continue to Grow,” Korea Economic Institute of America, January 16, 2018. https://keia.org/analysis/south-korean-losses-from-chinas-thaad-retaliation-continue-to-grow/
댓글 없음:
댓글 쓰기