Putin anticipated that the Ukrainians would greet the Russians with flowers, who would liberate them from Nazism and nationalism. Instead, the Ukrainians welcomed the Russians with anti-tank guided missiles like Jablin and Stingers and Ukrainian-made Skif or Stuhna.
- [THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR] BY SERHII PLOKHY -
double translation
I predicted that President Trump would fall into a quagmire like the Vietnam War of the past when he started the war against Iran. This is because Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare method is common in relatively small countries, contrary to the misjudgment of powerful leaders who only believe in the superiority of military power.
Iran would have expected a long-term war. Of course, in the United States, in a book titled [THE NEW RULES OF WAR], there was a suggestion that in order to win the regional war, the United States should cultivate asymmetric soldiers such as mercenaries in the future. And he was persuading the US government that it could cultivate a powerful special war army or regional agents at the cost of producing a stealth fighter. However, I thought it would not be a valid proposal because of the strategic value of stealth bombers, the linkage of the military industry in the United States, and human rights violations of serving soldiers or human rights during the war.
President Trump expected that anti-government activities in Iran would be effective if the U.S. invaded Iran, but he made the same mistake as President Putin. It is widely known as a textbook case that the inside of the invaded country turns into a unity through external aggression. Perhaps if the U.S. stops the war now, Iranians, who are fatigued, are likely to attribute the energy of defense against external aggression to the Iranian government.
This issue was also discussed with artificial intelligence. This is because, unlike myself who calls for peace, artificial intelligence is objective and impersonal.
Guerrilla War, Iran & the Superpower Paradox
[ English Edition ]
1. Iran's Strategy Against the U.S. — State-Level Guerrilla Warfare
Iran recognized decades ago that it cannot defeat the United States in conventional warfare. In response, it built a distinctive model that scales classical guerrilla strategy to the state level — what it calls the 'Axis of Resistance.'
Proxy network: Hezbollah (Lebanon), Houthis (Yemen), Iraqi Shia militias (PMF), Hamas & PIJ (Gaza)
Plausible deniability — attributing the violence to 'resistance forces' rather than Tehran
Asymmetric cost structure — a drone costs tens of thousands; an interceptor missile costs millions
'Geopolitical gray zones' as terrain — environments too complex for direct U.S. intervention
Key Insight | Iran's strategy is Mao and Che's principles applied to modern regional conflict — a deliberate choice of the weak against the strong. |
2. Special Forces vs. Stealth Jets — A Budget Philosophy War
U.S. special operations experts have argued that the cost of one F-22 (~$220M) could fund a SEAL platoon for over 40 years. But this debate is less about cost-effectiveness than about how one understands the nature of modern war.
Valid argument: In guerrilla and irregular warfare, SOF efficiency is overwhelming (2001 Afghanistan initial operations)
Key limitation: Special forces cannot solve the 'state-building' problem after regime change
Structural paradox: Scaling up SOF undermines its core strengths — secrecy and local trust
Conclusion: These tools are not rivals but complements serving different dimensions of conflict
3. The Superpower Quagmire
Vietnam (1965–75), Soviet Afghanistan (1979–89), U.S. Afghanistan (2001–21), Russia-Ukraine (2022–present) — all share the same structural trap.
Asymmetric will: the weaker side fights for survival; the stronger side fights for a cause — the side making a choice tires first
Undefined victory: annihilating the enemy does not end the war
Domestic political fatigue: public opinion, budgets, and elections override strategy
The futility of sacrifice: the U.S. and Vietnam are now partners — a future that could have arrived without the war
Liddell Hart | 'The object of war is a better peace.' A war where that peace is nowhere in sight must be questioned from the start. |
4. Trump's Paradox — 'Iranian Democracy' Dies Under Invasion
The Green Revolution (2009), the fuel price protests (2019), the Mahsa Amini uprising (2022) — all of Iran's anti-government resistance emerged organically from within. The moment American bombs fall, that energy reverses direction.
External threat suppresses internal dissent — 'Iranian identity' overrides grievances against the regime
For the IRGC, U.S. invasion is a gift: domestic opposition can be branded as 'collaborators with the enemy'
Iraq's precedent: the 2003 'liberation' produced sectarian civil war and ISIS, not democracy
The most effective force for change in Iran has always come from within Iran
5. War Fatigue Creates Revolutions
Just as the exhaustion of WWI produced the Russian Revolution of 1917, Iran is in the midst of a similar accumulation. The moment external threat disappears, the people's gaze turns inward again.
The rial has collapsed under sanctions; youth unemployment exceeds 25%
The children of the 1979 revolution generation are the regime's fiercest critics
Without an external threat, the regime loses its pretext to frame discontent as 'enemy infiltration'
Prices, unemployment, corruption, suppressed freedoms — buried during wartime, they resurface in peace
6. True Pragmatism — The Choice Before Trump
The core proposal: a genuine deal-maker would announce that Iran has suffered enough, and declare an end to the war 'for true peace and prosperity.' This is consistent with Trump's own self-defined identity.
Business logic: cutting losses on a no-return investment is decisiveness, not defeat — Nixon's 'peace with honor' is the precedent
'Bestowing peace upon Iran' is the language of a benefactor, not a loser — perfectly aligned with Trump's brand
Structural obstacles: Israel, the pro-Israel lobby, and the evangelical base create binding constraints
Realistic exit: return to the negotiating table, freeze the nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief — the only viable endpoint when military goals are unachievable
Conclusion | The most effective path to changing Iran is not bombing but patience — allowing internal space for change to grow. What the IRGC fears most is not American bombs but the quiet fractures within. |
이형춘× Claude | 2026.04.24
댓글 없음:
댓글 쓰기